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THE GREEN TO BLUE PIPELINE: DEFENSE
CONTRACTORS AND THE POLICE INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX
Karena Rahallt
Images of police in tactical gear, pointing automatic weapons at
unarmed demonstrators in Ferguson, Missouri, represented a flashpoint in
public awareness that American police are rapidly militarizing. Federal
grants have been quietly arming police with tanks, drones, and uniforms
more suited to waging war than patrolling the streets. As police have
acquired more military gear, Special Weapons and Tactics teams and
deployments have proliferated. Even small towns receive surplus military
materiel to fight the "wars" on drugs and terrorism. In addition, police
training uses a military approach that threatens to transform the
traditional police mandate of protecting and serving into one of engaging
and defeating. This Article is the first in legal scholarship to analyze the
causes of police militarization and the obstacles to curbing it.
This Article analyzes the factors that drive police militarization, from a
historical, legal, and financial perspective. It examines the multiple federal
grant programs that provide the funding for, and incentivize,
militarization-like the Department of Defense Program that distributes
military materiel with little oversight regarding its use, and the Department
of Homeland Security grant program that dispenses billions in funds to buy
weapons and equipment. It exposes defense industry efforts to ensure
Congress keeps the gear flowing; as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind
down, the industry turns to the domestic market to fill the gap in sales. The
Article analyzes the failure of the judicial system to address excessive force
claims in the context of ever-increasing militarized SWAT team raids, and
proposes more effective routes to reform.
t Visiting Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. Thanks to Anna Roberts,
Charlotte Garden, Nancy Leong, Brooke Coleman, Julie Shapiro, and Nicole Bellina for such
helpful guidance and advice. A special thanks also to Beth Kregor and the organizers of the 2014
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Clinical Conference Works In Progress Program,
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INTRODUCTION
Events in Ferguson, Missouri during August 2014, brought
militarization of the domestic police into the public eye., A
phenomenon not previously subject to much public debate, it became
front-page news as battle-ready police confronted mostly peaceful
protesters, firing tear gas and wooden bullets from armored military
vehicles.2 Snipers with ballistic helmets were seen perched atop what
1 See Julie Bosman & Timothy Williams, Missouri Police Cite Threats in Deciding Not to
Name Officer Who Shot Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/
13/us/ferguson-police-cite-safety-risk-in-decision-not-to-name-officer-in-shooting.html
(reporting on protests by citizens when an unarmed teenage boy was shot and killed by a police
officer).
2 See Julie Bosman & Matt Apuzzo, In Wake of Clashes, Calls to Demilitarize Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at Al.
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appeared to be tanks, aiming at the unarmed civilians below.3 The
images prompted the public to question why a police department in a
city of 20,000 residents looked like an invading army engaged in urban
warfare against its own citizens.4 This Article answers that question and
analyzes how militarization of domestic police came to fruition,
detailing its escalation and the failure of the judicial system to stop it.
Although the events in Ferguson presented a disturbing picture, it
is far from the only striking example of the increased militarization of
the police.s Towns with fewer than 700 residents have acquired military
gear from the federal government costing millions of dollars.6 Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams have increased dramatically in
both number and in the frequency of deployments, including for
nonemergency purposes like investigating organic farms, nightclubs,
barbershops, and even poker games.7 SWAT deployments have
increased more than 1400% since the 1980s with the implementation of
the "war on drugs."s The "war on terror" only exacerbated the
expansion. Currently, the federal government spends billions of dollars
annually to fund and equip domestic police departments with military
hardware like the Lenco Ballistic Engineered Armored Response
Counter Attack Truck (BearCat),9 one of the vehicles used by police in
Ferguson during the demonstrations.10 Despite the costs, local police
departments clamor for such items, which they contend may be
necessary in case of a rare but deadly incident like the school shooting in
Newtown, Connecticut."
3 See id.
4 See id.; see also Zeke J. Miller, Obama Voices Concerns on Police Militarization in Wake of
Ferguson, TIME, Aug. 18, 2014, http://time.com/3138267/obama-ferguson-police-militarization.
s See infra Parts I, III.
6 See AP IMPACT: Little Restraint in Military Giveaways, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 31, 2013,
7:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=207340981 [hereinafter AP
IMPACT].
7 See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR Cop: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA'S
POLICE FORCES 286 (2013).
8 See Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing-Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 1
POLICING: J. POL'Y & PRAC. 501 (2007). Paramilitary police deployments increased 1400%
between 1980 and 2000. Id. In the 1980s, there was an average of 3000 deployments per year; and
by the year 2000, that number escalated to an average of 45,000 deployments per year. Id.
9 See BearCat Variants, LENCO ARMOR, http://www.lencoarmor.com/law-enforcement/
bearcat-variants (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). Marketed to law enforcement, the BearCat touts its
urban tactics capability and weighs approximately 17,000 pounds, with a rotating roof hatch and
multiple side gun ports.
10 See Bosman & Apuzzo, supra note 2 (depicting a BearCat).
11 See Rob Wolfe, Police Get Military Gear: Upper Valley Agencies Use Defense Program,
VALLEY NEWS, Jan. 11, 2015, http://www.vnews.com/news/14841225-95/police-get-military-gear-
upper-valley-agencies-use-defense-program; Aaron Canti, 4 Shocking Examples of Police
Militarization in America's Small Towns, SALON (Mar. 28, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/03/28/4_shocking examples-of police militarization in americas
small townstpartner; Zachary T. Sampson et al., Local Law Enforcement Nets Military Supplies
Through Controversial Pentagon Program, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015, 6:45 PM),
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While the public is becoming more aware of the presence of
military equipment and the kinds of military tactics employed by police
departments, such awareness is insufficient to craft meaningful reform
unless one also understands the forces and incentives that have impelled
its rapid growth and that make it so challenging to stop. This Article fills
two gaps in legal scholarship by offering both the first detailed
examination of the phenomenon of police militarization, and the first
analysis of the factors-historical, legal, and financial-that permit and
foster it.
Part I traces the key factors that have led to the current level of
police militarization. After a brief explanation of police militarization's
historical roots, this Part uncovers and performs a critical analysis of
two central factors contributing to its recent growth: (1) grants and
other assistance to police departments from multiple federal agencies;
and (2) lobbying by the defense industry and law enforcement. Part II
demonstrates that legal claims relating to the effects of militarization,
principally claims of excessive force, have failed to provide a remedy for
the harms involved in militarized policing. Part III asserts that a remedy
is needed, and explores what that remedy might be. Part III.A highlights
recent examples of militarization to demonstrate the types of harm
involved. Part JJJ.B analyzes the kinds of solutions that are being
proposed, and makes additional recommendations.
This Article asserts that militarization in both tactics and
equipment has led to an escalation in violent encounters between
citizens and police that is not being addressed by the judicial system and
that requires holistic action. With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
drawing down and defense contractors seeking new markets,12 domestic
militarization has undergone an expansion, through a process this
Article terms the "green to blue pipeline." This trend threatens to
further erode what was once a clear delineation between military and
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/local-law-enforcement-nets-military-supplies-
through-controversial/2212335; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
H.R. 1119, 105th Cong. § 1033 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-105hr
1119enr/pdf/BILLS-105hrll9enr.pdf; Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, BUREAU JUST.
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ProgramID=59 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2015) ("Byrne Grant" Awards descriptions).
12 See Darwin BondGraham, From Top Cop to the Corporate Boardroom: Ex-Police Chiefs Spin
Through Revolving Doors into the Private Sector, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 11, 2013, 9:29 AM),
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20554-from-top-cop-to-the-corporate-boardroom-ex-
police-chiefs-spin-through-revolving-doors-into-the-private-sector; see also Dvrtransfer, Urban
Shield 2009 - Highlight Video, YouTUBE (Jan. 25, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
TAWp-bjEAxs (showing videos of "Urban Shield" SWAT Competition Events sponsored by
Blackhawk Industries, Lenco Armored Vehicles, and other military defense contractors); Nemi
Jones, The Lenco Bearcat G3.mp4, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
gipHbhgJaX4 (promotional video for Lenco Armored Vehicles).
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domestic policing.13 The influence of federal and corporate money on
police decisionmaking means that insufficient attention is given to what
local communities actually need. As the juggernaut of militarization
moves forward, the police are at risk of being transformed from
protectors of the community into soldiers fighting a war against it.
I. How DID SMALLVILLE GET AN MRAP?
The presence of military weaponry in domestic policing is not
entirely new. The first SWAT team was formed in 1967 by Los Angeles
Police Inspector Daryl Gates, in response to what he viewed as the
police department's failure to control and suppress the riots in the Watts
neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.14 Paramilitary Police Units
(PPUs),15 like SWAT, proliferated in the decade that followed but were
limited to small groups of police officers within a department who had
specialized military training16 to deal with riots, hostage situations, and
terrorists.17 Over time, that mission has expanded to deal first with the
so-called "war on drugs" and now the "war on terrorism."1s With
mission expansion came SWAT expansion around the United States.
According to Peter Kraska, who has done some of the most extensive
empirical studies of SWAT teams available, approximately 59% of police
departments serving populations of 50,000 or more had SWAT teams in
1982, but by the mid-1990s that number had reached 89%.19 This
expansion is not limited to large cities; currently, 80% of towns with
populations below 50,000 have some form of paramilitary tactical team,
while only 20% had them in 1980.20 Between 1980 and 2000, there was a
1400% increase in SWAT deployments.21 So while the hardware and
tactical methodology associated with paramilitary policing has existed
since the 1960s, the expansion and escalation of these units has
increased primarily in response to the "wars" on drugs and terrorism.
13 Since 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) has generally provided that federal military
troops are not permitted to act as domestic law enforcement officers. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).
Although certain exceptions related to emergency powers and information sharing have been
passed by Congress-thus eroding the original force of the statute-the heart of the law remains
intact. See id.
14 See BALKO, supra note 7, at 61-63.
15 While PPUs cover all types of tactical paramilitary units (of which SWAT is one) this
Article will employ the term "SWAT" throughout, unless a particular tactical unit of a different
name is sourced.
16 See BALKO, supra note 7, at 96.
17 See Kraska, supra note 8, at 6.
18 See id. at 5-6.





Federal assistance to domestic police agencies has increased
dramatically since the 1990s,22 and has enabled this trend to continue
unabated. Research done by Kraska, among others, has demonstrated
that when police have access to weapons and armament, they tend to
use them, even if not for their intended purpose.23 Section L.A details the
federal programs that exist to supply weapons, tactical gear, armored
personnel carriers (APCs), and training to domestic police agencies
around the United States. Section I.B exposes the financial incentives to
continue and escalate this trend by tracing the corporate lobbying
efforts directed at both politicians and police departments. With more
transparency about those who benefit most, either financially or
politically, the public and legal scholars might better understand how
this trend threatens democratic institutions of self-governance and find
ways to reverse it.
A. Federal Grants to Police: "Wars" on Terrorism and Drugs
In 1989, the federal government, through the Department of
Defense (DOD), allocated funds to supply domestic police departments
with military hardware and training for the purpose of combatting
illegal drug activity.24 Since then, several other programs have been
created through the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to support domestic
policing efforts related to both the "war on drugs" and the "war on
terrorism."25 The extraordinary expansion of these programs-and the
funds directed to support them-has led to an unsurprising escalation
in the militarization of police in American towns and cities.26 This
militarization takes the form of both weapons deployment and tactical
strategies, which continue to increase, unchecked, with little to no
oversight either federally or at the state and local levels. This Section will
outline the background of these programs and the current allocation of
federal resources to domestic police departments. The Section will also
look at several examples in which military hardware has been deployed
domestically in order to illustrate the depth of the militarization of
police departments in both large and small communities. Moreover, it
22 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICAN POLICING 24 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU Report], available at https://www.aclu.org/
feature/war-comes-home?redirect=war-comes-home-excessive-militarization-american-policing.
23 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 16; Kraska, supra note 8.
24 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
189, § 1208, 103 Stat. 1352 (1989).
25 See infra Part II.A.1-2.
26 See BALKO, supra note 7, at 202-03.
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will consider what, if any, oversight exists to ensure that these weapons
are properly deployed in the context of public service rather than war.
1. Department of Defense Programs
Within the DOD, there are two distinct programs dedicated to
supplying domestic police departments with military hardware. The
strategy and implementation that funds police agencies to wage the
"wars" on drugs and terrorism, using military weapons and armaments,
originated in the DOD and expanded from there to other federal
agencies. With the approval of Congress-and the concomitant support
of the defense industry that supplies the materiel-these programs have
funneled military vehicles (for land, sea, and air), weapons,
ammunition, and tactical training valued in the billions of dollars to
local police departments in the United States.
a. 1033 Program: Transfer of Equipment
In 1989, a temporary funding allocation authorized the transfer of
surplus military equipment from the federal government to federal,
state, and local police agencies primarily for the purpose of dealing with
illegal drug activity.27 The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) made the program permanent and expanded its mandate to
include law enforcement efforts to address terrorism.28 Commonly
referred to as the 1033 Program,29 this DOD program allows law
enforcement agencies to receive military hardware including armored
vehicles (for air, sea, and land), night vision goggles, ballistic helmets,
tactical vests, televisions, cameras, computers, and even camping gear.30
Those agencies can find the equipment by either browsing online3l or
shopping for equipment at one of the physical locations where the
equipment is stored.32 Since its inception, the program has dispersed
27 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 16.
28 See 10 U.S.C. § 2576a (2012).
29 The original section pertaining to surplus military equipment transfer in NDAA 1997 was
1033.
30 See The 1033 Program, JUSTNET, https://www.justnet.org/other/1033_program.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2015). Local law enforcement agencies apply to participate in the 1033 Program
through their State Point of Contact (SPOC) and, if approved, the application is sent to the
DOD's Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), which is run by the Defense Logistics Agency.
See id.
31 See Property Search, DISPOSITION SERVICES, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY,
http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/PropertySearch.aspx (last visited Mar. 29,
2015) (LESO website page with listings of available property).
32 See DLA Disposition Services Site Locator Tool, DISPOSITION SERVICES, DEF. LOGISTICS
AGENCY, http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/drmo/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29,
2015) (LESO website page for interactive location search for stored equipment; aircraft, tactical
vehicles, and weapons, however, are not listed in the online database).
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property valued at more than $5.1 billion, including $450 million in
2013 alone.33 According to the DOD, over 11,500 domestic law
enforcement agencies take part in the 1033 Program.34
The 1033 Program does not provide any regulatory oversight of
police departments and the manner in which they use military
equipment. Of the many different types of equipment transferred, APCs
provide a stark example of how police departments are not only looking
more like the military, but acting like small armies.35 APCs used in the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are being repurposed for use in American
cities and towns by SWAT teams.3 6 In addition, most jurisdictions do
not have policies governing the circumstances under which SWAT
teams should deploy,37 nor do most police departments collect data on
those deployments in order to assess whether they are effective or
necessary under various circumstances.38 Moreover, under the 1033
Program, recipients must use the equipment they receive within one
year of its acquisition.39 Finally, oversight by the DOD on the use of the
equipment it gives away consists only of inventory checks and random
field visits to ensure the inventory is secure.40 The combination of
military materiel intended for use in war zones and a lack of oversight
gives rise to the unchecked escalation of militarization of domestic
police forces, in which no regulatory body tracks the manner in which
the equipment is used or crafts policy governing appropriate uses.
Because there is little oversight and no policy governing
appropriate use of 1033 Program gear, it is difficult to know how
departments are utilizing what they receive. If police departments lack
the need for APCs to combat violent crime, they must find other uses
for them per the 1033 requirement.41 Thus, it is concerning that a
significant number of small towns, with little crime, have obtained these
33 See LESO Homepage, DISPOSITION SERVICES, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY,
http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) (LESO
website page about the 1033 Program).
34 See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2015 BUDGET
ESTIMATES (2014), available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2015/budget justification/pdfs/02_Procurement/1 PROCUREMENTMasterJustification
Book Defense Wide PB 2015-Vol 1.pdf. Others put that number closer to 17,000. But see
ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 24; BALKO, supra note 7, at 210.
35 See Sadhbh Walshe, Ferguson Is What Happens when White Suburban Cops Get Weapons of
War, GUARDIAN, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/14/
ferguson-cops-military-weapons-michael-brown-shooting-protests (noting that Ferguson,
Missouri, has only about 21,000 residents, but deployed APCs, including a Lenco BearCat, and
fired rubber bullets and tear gas at people protesting the police shooting of an unarmed black
teenager days earlier).
36 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 22.
37 See id. at 4.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 16. (citing Memoranda of Agreement between the DOD and each state).
40 Id. at 83-89.
41 See id. at 16.
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military vehicles and armaments.42 For example, Roanoke Rapids, North
Carolina, has a population of less than 16,000 but acquired both
Humvees43 and a Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle
in 2013.44 Merrillville, Indiana, with 35,000 residents, got an MRAP for
their SWAT team in 2013.45 Even Ohio State University got one.46 Small
towns like Neenah, Wisconsin;47 Currituck, North Carolina;48
Washington, lowa;49 and Watertown, Connecticut5O all applied for and
received free MRAPs. Approximately 500 police departments have
received MRAPs so far.51 They all must put them to use in some way
within a year of acquisition and this requirement gives rise to an
increasing number of SWAT team formations and deployments.
Aside from APCs, police departments in small towns and cities
have received other military hardware that seems out of place for their
sizes. In Fairmount, Georgia, a town of 7000 people, the police
department has acquired 17,145 items through the 1033 Program.52
Bloomington, Georgia, only has 2713 residents, yet it acquired four
grenade launchers.53 Tupelo, Mississippi, with a population of 35,000,
got a free helicopter that costs $20,000 per year to maintain.54 Rising
Star, Texas, with a population of 835, employing one full-time police
officer, garnered $3.2 million in 1033 Program property over a fourteen-
42 See Michael Virtanen, Spoils of War: Police Getting Leftover Iraq Trucks, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 24, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/spoils-war-police-getting-leftover-iraq-
trucks.
43 The High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), commonly known as the
Humvee, is manufactured by AM General LLC. See AM General Vehicles & Components, AM
GEN., http://www.amgeneral.com/vehicles (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
44 Hank Johnson & Michael Shank, Small Town America Shouldn't Resemble War Zone:




47 Matt Agorist, Wisconsin Police Reassure Residents They Won't Be Shot at from Military
Truck, THEFREETHOUGHTPROJECT.COM (May 20, 2014), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/
wisconsin-police-reassure-residents-wont-shot-military-truck/#IjEOSLT54wXEVriy.01.
48 Jeff Hampton, Currituck Sheriffs Office Gets an 18-Ton Armored Truck, PILOTONLINE.COM
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/12/currituck-sheriffs-office-gets-18ton-armored-
truck.
49 Ben Collins, Your Local Police Force's Next Vehicle: Tanks. Actual Tanks, ESQUIRE (Apr. 11,
2014), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a28322/local-police-tanks.
50 See Taylor Wofford, How America's Police Became an Army: The 1033 Program,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-police-became-army- 1033-
program-264537.
51 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 5.
52 See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Small-Town Cops Pile up on Useless Military Gear,
WIRED (June 26, 2012, 6:31 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/cops-military-gear/all.
53 See Wofford, supra note 50. Another small Georgia town, Bloomingdale, also received
armored trucks, personnel carriers, and grenade launchers. See Rhonda Cook, Military Equipment
Flowing to Local Law Enforcement Raises Questions, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 27, 2013, 5:00 AM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/military-equipment-flowing-to-local-law-enforcemen/nT7ZK.
54 See Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 52.
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month period.55 Oxford, Alabama, with a population of 20,000, received
$3 million worth of equipment, including M-16s, helmet-mounted
infrared goggles, and their very own Puma tank.56 Morven, Georgia only
has 565 residents but it got $4 million worth of property, including three
boats, SCUBA gear (in a town with no bodies of water), a Humvee, an
unspecified APC, and surplus rifles that its sheriff intends to use to build
a SWAT team.57 Given that it is a small farming community, it is
difficult to comprehend why the SWAT team is necessary in the town.
Problems with oversight result in an inability to analyze exactly
how 1033 items are utilized once transferred,58 but abuse of even the
limited oversight that exists in the program has occurred on numerous
occasions. In 2012, the DOD temporarily suspended all firearms
transfers through its 1033 Program after a series of troubling incidents,59
including one in which a sheriff in Illinois was caught lending M-14
rifles to friends. 60 The state property manager tasked with securing 1033
materiel in North Carolina pled guilty to stealing assault weapons and
selling them on eBay,61 and in Arizona, the Pinal County sheriff was
discovered loaning weapons and other equipment to non-law
enforcement personnel and planning to auction other equipment to
make money for his department.62 In yet another incident, an M-16
simply went missing altogether. 63 Still, these incidents resulted in only a
brief suspension of firearms transfers; other 1033 Program equipment
transfers remained unaffected.64 These incidents underscore the
difficulty the 1033 Program has had maintaining sufficient oversight of
its transferred stockpiles. The possibly more concerning issue, which is
not addressed by the program-and is examined in Part Ill-is how
55 Paul Szoldra, Small-Town Police Departments Are Getting Billions in Big Military
Hardware, Bus. INSIDER (July 31, 2013, 8:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/police-
department-militarization-2013-7.
56 See Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 52.
57 See AP IMPACT, supra note 6; 2010 Census Population for Morven City, Georgia, AM.
FACTFINDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community
facts.xhtml (search "Morven City, Georgia"; then follow "Go" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 12,
2015).
58 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 30.
59 See Radley Balko, Pentagon Suspends Program that Gives Military Weapons to Cops,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/11/
pentagon-suspends-weapons-program-cops-military n_1585328.html.
60 See AP IMPACT, supra note 6.
61 Id.
62 See Dennis Wagner, Pinal County Policies Spur Pentagon to Order Military-Gear
Crackdown, AZCENTRAL.COM (June 1, 2012, 11:18 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/
articles/2012/06/01/20120601pinal-policies-pentagon-military-gear-crackdown.html.
63 See Nate Carlisle, Utah Deputy Had Missing M-16 in Safe for Eight Years, Sheriff Says, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2014, 7:51 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/news/1415926-155/deputy-rifle-
sheriff-office-county-release.
64 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 80 (citing responses to written questions posed by
Congressman Hank Johnson to the DOD and Defense Logistics Agency).
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these items are used by police departments and whether they are
necessary, effective or dangerous.
b. 1122 Program: Purchase of New Equipment
In addition to offering law enforcement agencies military hardware
at no cost, the federal government also offers a method by which those
agencies can purchase parts to maintain the hardware, as well as new
equipment. Through what is known as the 1122 Program, the DOD acts
as a pass-through for both equipment purchases and parts.65 Originally
part of the NDAA of 1994, the program was intended to assist law
enforcement in counterdrug activity.66 Like the amendment o the 1033
Program, the Act covering the 1122 Program was amended to include
procurement for counterterrorism activity.67 While the 1033 Program
deals primarily with surplus military equipment that the military no
longer needs or will not use,6 8 the 1122 Program is limited to the
purchase of new equipment.69 Law enforcement agencies benefit from
the purchasing power of the federal government-which can buy
equipment in bulk-on behalf of the agencies. Unlike the 1033 Program,
the 1122 Program does not furnish the equipment for free, but allows
law enforcement to purchase items with their own funds through the
DOD.70 Items available for purchase through the program include
weapons and ammunition, aviation parts, night vision goggles,
personnel carriers, joint light tactical gear, battle dress uniforms
(BDUs), and "land weapon systems" parts.71
Having access to parts through the 1122 Program allows police
agencies to maintain the equipment that it receives through the 1033
Program. Maintenance for some vehicles can be particularly expensive;
for example, one tire replacement for the MRAP costs approximately
65 See 1122 Program, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/202569?
utm source=FAS&utm medium=print-radio&utm term= 1122program&utm campaign=
shortcuts (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). The 1122 Program refers to the original section of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 that allocated funds and authority for local law
enforcement to procure new military hardware through the federal governments requisition
channels.
66 See National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 381 (2012).
67 See id. (as amended by section 885 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization
Act of 2009).
68 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 80 (noting that 36% of all equipment transferred under
the 1033 Program is not surplus but newly purchased by the DOD solely for domestic purposes).
69 1122 Program, supra note 65.
70 Items may be purchased in three possible ways: (1) directly from the Department of the
Army; (2) through the Defense Logistics Agency; and (3) using third party contractors through
the DOD supply chain and purchasing structure. See The 1122 Program, JUSTNET,
https://www.justnet.org/other/1122_program.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).





$2500,72 while the less expensive Lenco BearCat's tires are $7083 for a
set of six.73 So the programs often work in support of one another, and
consequently, defense contractors can expect to profit through both
manufacturing and maintenance.
2. Department of Justice Programs
The DOJ administers two grants programs aimed at fighting the
"war on drugs." While the mandates for these grants have expanded to
include counterterrorism activity and more generally violent crime
issues, they are still focused more specifically on addressing illegal drug
crimes.74 Though these programs do not rely solely on military
equipment to achieve their goals, they do provide the financial incentive
to utilize both military weapons and tactics because arrest statistics are
tied to funding allocations, rewarding grant recipients for high numbers
of drug arrests.75 Since SWAT teams deploy for the purpose of serving
search warrants for drugs the vast majority of the time, these grants fuel
militarization. 76 Despite their mandates that include drug treatment and
community policing,.7 these programs incentivize patterns and practices
which serve to remake the police from a force that serves the public to
one that sees the public as a revenue-generating mechanism at best-
and as an enemy at worst.
a. Byrne Justice Assistance Grants
In 1968, Congress created a $100 million grant program to provide
states and municipalities with funding to research the social causes of
criminal activity, provide alternative sanctions for juveniles, and combat
street crime.78 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance (Byrne JAG)
72 See Jeremy Fugleberg, Wyoming Cops Pick up Their Fourth Military Surplus Armored
MRAP Vehicle, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (June 21, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://trib.com/news/state-and-
regional/wyoming-cops-pick-up-their-fourth-military-surplus-armored-mrap/article bd597095-
355f-5628-alaO-93fc8cc738d6.html.
73 See FED. SUPPLY SERV., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., AUTHORIZED FEDERAL SUPPLY SCHEDULE
PRICE LIST (2013), available at https://www.gsaadvantage.gov/ref text/GS07FO390M/GSO7F
0390M online.htm.
74 See ACLU Report, supra note 22.
75 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EDWARD BYRNE JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2014) [hereinafter BJA JAG Fact Sheet],
available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAGFactSheet.pdf.
76 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 31 (finding 79% of SWAT deployments used to serve
warrants and 60% of those were for drug searches).
77 See ALEXIA D. COOPER & KIMBERLY MARTIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM, 2014 (2014) [hereinafter Byrne Grant
Technical Report], available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAGTechRpt.pdf.
78 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 520, 82 Stat.
197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2012)), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OSEC/library/legislative histories/1615.pdf.
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grants-named for a New York City Police officer killed by drug dealers
in 1988-are the present-day method by which these grants are
allocated. 79 Byrne JAG grants have awarded over $5 billion since 2005
alone.so The DOJ is permitted to allocate over $1 billion per year in
Byrne JAG grants.81 However, the funding averaged $500 million a year
until 2009 when the program experienced a windfall $2 billion infusion
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.82 The
funding covers a broad swath of criminal justice areas and the amount
of funding can be increased based on crime statistics within the state or
locality.83 Therefore, if crime goes up, funding follows.
While Byrne JAG grants cover such criminal justice reform efforts
as drug rehabilitation and alternative sentencing,84 the bulk of the
funding goes directly to law enforcement activity.85 In fact, between
2012 and 2013, 64% of the funds were spent on law enforcement-
which includes equipment for police cars, radios, uniforms, tactical
vests, hiring additional officers, and funding devoted to 680,667 hours
of overtime pay.86 During the same time period, funds spent on grants
dedicated to drug treatment, which includes enforcement mechanisms
like probation, were just 5%.87 So while the program purports to fund
areas that are generally considered reform-minded, the lion's share of
the funded activity is directly related to policing and not education or
rehabilitation.88 Moreover, it is directed primarily at drug enforcement
which comprises the majority of paramilitary deployments.
79 See BJA JAG Fact Sheet, supra note 75; About Officer Byrne, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE,
U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, https://www.bja.gov/Programs/OfficerByrne.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004), merged
a discretionary grant program (originally part of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act) with a formula-
based block grant program called Local Law Enforcement Block Grant program (LLEBG). BJA
JAG Fact Sheet, supra note 75. Currently, grants are awarded based on the population of the state
and its share of violent crime statistics with 60% allocated to the state and 40% discretionary
funding to local governments deemed eligible. Id. The grants cover the following program areas:
(1) law enforcement; (2) prosecution and courts; (3) corrections and community corrections; (4)
drug treatment; and (5) planning, evaluation, and technology improvement. Id.
80 Id.
81 See Program and Funding History, NAT'L CENTER FOR JUST. PLAN., http://ncjp.org/byrne-
jag/history (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
82 See Of's Information Related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, OFF.
JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, http://ojp.gov/recovery (last visited Mar. 29, 2015)
[hereinafter Recovery Act Overview].
83 See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS
RECOVERY ACT GRANTS (2009), available at http://ojp.gov/recovery/pdfs/ojpfactsheet.pdf.
84 See Byrne Grant Technical Report, supra note 77.
85 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GRANT ACTIVITY REPORT: JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM 2 (2013) [hereinafter JAG Activity Report], available at
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAGLEGrantActivity_03-13.pdf.
86 Id. at 2-5.
87 Id. at 2.
88 See id. at 6, 10. Almost a quarter of all Byrne JAG funding goes to joint task forces that
focus on drug arrests, gang arrests, and firearm seizures. See id. at 6. These task forces combine
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State and local police agencies have come to depend on the largesse
of Byrne JAG funding, which rewards police for combatting drug crimes
and incentivizes the types of military deployments that are increasingly
used in anti-drug enforcement.89 Police agencies use that funding for
hiring, overtime, and equipment;90 in turn, they make as many drug and
other arrests as necessary to qualify for further funding.91 The number
of drug raids and arrests is thus tied to federal funding and federal
priorities,92 rather than defined by local policies that might determine
whether such raids are a net benefit to the community. Illustrative of
this point is the response by law enforcement when Byrne JAG funding
was threatened with a 67% reduction in 2007.93 Police departments and
joint drug task forces across the country staged "Operation Byrne Blitz,"
in which they spent twenty-four hours in a nonstop effort to
demonstrate the value of the work the grants fund, arresting hundreds
of people and seizing large-and, in some cases, quite small-quantities
of drugs.94 The funding was restored in 2009, with a one-time infusion
local, state, and federal law enforcement personnel and provide police departments with the
ability to hire new officers to take part, pay for overtime for existing officers, and pay for the
equipment and vehicles used in the services of the task forces. See id. Approximately 75% of all
arrests resulting from task force and anti-drug enforcement were charged as felonies. Id. at 8.
89 See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF FULL FUNDING FOR THE
BYRNE JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.csg.org/
knowledgecenter/docs/JAGResolution-Final.pdf ("According to lowa Senator Tom Harkin, each
year Byrne JAG dollars fund over 4,000 police officers and prosecutors working on over 750 drug
enforcement task forces in all 50 states across hundreds of urban and rural countries and cities.");
Letter from Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. to the Leadership of Congress (Mar. 3, 2008), available
at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/20080331.ByrneJAG Funding.pdf ("Byrne/JAG
is currently the only source of funding available for multi-jurisdictional drug enforcement,
including methamphetamine initiatives, and is critical for drug courts, law enforcement
information sharing, gang prevention, and prisoner reentry programs."); Press Release, TomPAC,
Harkin Fights to Restore Anti-Drug Program Funding (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.tomharkin.com/2008/2/28/harkin-fights-to-restore-anti-drug-program-funding/
index.html (claiming that lowa would lose its ability to fight drug crimes if funding was not
restored); Ronnie Garrett, The Over Byrne Cuts, OFFICER.COM (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://www.officer.com/article/10249004/the-over-byrne-cuts (citing examples of drug task forces
that would be eliminated by decreased funding).
90 See JAG Activity Report, supra note 85, at 2.
91 See BJA JAG Fact Sheet, supra note 75; BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAMS
(2012), available at https://www.bja.gov/Programs/JAG-Questionnaire-All.pdf (questions
include numbers of arrests and amounts of property seized).
92 See JAKE WIENS, PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, GETTING BYRNED BY JUSTICE:
FAVORITISM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BYRNE DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRAM (2008),
available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/co/byrne/doj-grant-report-20080619.pdf (detailing failure
of BJA to follow its own peer review process while awarding grants based on patronage and
Congressional earmarks).
93 See Radley Balko, Burn the Byrne, REASON.COM (Apr. 15, 2008),
http://reason.com/archives/2008/04/15/burn-the-byrne.
94 See id.; see also Press Release, Sheriffs Office, Towns County, "Operation: Byrne Blitz" a
Success in Towns County (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://townssheriff.com/files/Op-byrne
blitz press.pdf; Kelly Foreman, CKADTF Arrests Total 13, Part of National Drug Blitz, RICH. REG.
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of $2 billion, and continues as of 2014.95 Whether the "blitz" garnered
more drug kingpins than low level offenders is unknown, but the point
of the exercise was to show a large quantity of arrests and seizures, and
measured by that standard it appears to have been a success. Becoming
dependent on such funding and tying it to arrest and conviction
statistics is dangerous, foments corruption, and has led to numerous
illegal arrests and prosecutions carried out by Byrne JAG grant
recipients.96 Coupled with the kind of military hardware, weaponry, and
training available through other federal funding, this program raises
serious concerns about the semi-federalized policing standards in
operation across the United States.
b. Community Oriented Policing Services Grants
In addition to the funds available for hiring through Byrne JAG
grants, the DOJ also administers grants for training and supporting local
law enforcement agencies through Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) grants.97 The primary mandate of COPS is to hire more
police officers and supply funds for overtime pay and training.98
Formulated in 1994 in another effort to wage the "war on drugs," this
program offers funds to cover 75% of the cost of any approved grants
but the Attorney General can waive the matching funds requirement
and increase the grant to 100%.99 In its first two years, COPS spent an
average of $1.4 billion per year with the goal of adding 100,000 police
officers to departments across the country.100 After another large influx
of federal money in 2009,101 many of the programs were transferred to
(Mar. 8, 2008, 8:20 PM), http://www.richmondregister.com/news/local news/ckadtf-arrests-total-
part-of-national-drug-blitz/article fa24c260-fa46-5ade-8e0c-2c9bdca28386.html; Tim Harlow,
Operation Byrne Blitz Drug Sweep Nets 172 Arrests, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2008, 11:42 AM),
http://www.startribune.com/local/16385271.html ("As part of Operation Byrne Blitz, drug task
forces from throughout the state arrested 172 people and seized 23 pounds of marijuana, 1½
pounds of powder cocaine, 3½ pounds of methamphetamine and 3 pounds of various
prescription drugs in a sweep on Wednesday."); Statewide Drug Sweep Nets 757 Arrests, Major
Drug Seizures, FLA. DEP'T L. ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/
News/2008/March-2008/Statewide-Drug-Sweep-Nets-757-Arrests,-Major-Drug-.aspx.
95 See Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE,
https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ProgramID=59#horizontalTabl (last visited Mar. 29,
2015); Recovery Act Overview, supra note 82. In 2013, Byrne JAG awards totaled approximately
$280 million. See BJA JAG Fact Sheet, supra note 75.
96 See Drug Task Force Scandals: A National Look, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/
tuliatexas/scandals.html (last updated Feb. 23, 2009) (displaying an interactive map of recent
Byrne task force-related scandals).
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (2012).
98 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33308, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING
SERVICES (COPS): BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 1 (2014), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view
&did=750707.
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd(g).




another administrator and the budget for 2014 is a much lower-but
still significant-$200 million.102 With these funds, even small towns
were able to muster enough troops to start their own SWAT teams, and
by keeping arrests high, even small departments can justify the
continued flow of gear and money. 103
While the name suggests that the grants might fund opportunities
for police to engage more fully with their local communities in an effort
to handle crime concerns cooperatively, COPS has no such mandate.
However, some view militarized policing as a type of community
policing strategy104 so the name is only a misnomer if one assumes a
particular, perhaps even provincial, definition of the term. In fact, when
asked about community policing in his study on SWAT teams, Peter
Kraska reported that 63% of respondents in his survey viewed the role of
SWAT teams as an important component of community policing.105
While oversight for COPS grants includes possible random site visits
and a self-assessment o ensure departments are not reducing the
budget for officer salaries just to take advantage of the grants, there is
nothing about the program that restricts using the funding for
paramilitary activity.106 Notably, even a senior researcher for COPS,
Karl Bickel, has flagged the militarization trend as a serious problem
that undermines the traditional notion of what community policing
should be.107 In tracing the escalation of militarized police encounters
through paramilitary forces like SWAT, Bickel notes that merely
wearing the BDUs (which has become so ubiquitous for even patrol
officers) can produce aggressive tendencies in the wearer.108 The barriers
that this warrior mentality invokes are, according to Bickel, an
impediment to a sustainable cooperative relationship of mutual respect
between the police and the community.
102 Id.
103 See BALKO, supra note 7, at 207. COPS, Byrne, and other block grants were awarded to
departments based entirely on the number of drug arrests made by each department and drug
arrests skyrocketed as a result. Steven Elbow, Military Muscle Comes to Mayberry: U.S. Donates
Gear, Grenade Launchers, CAP. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/
n1519/a06.html. The resulting funding followed suit and small towns in Wisconsin were able to
start their own SWAT teams and qualify for military armaments under the 1033 Program. Id.
104 See Kraska, supra note 8, at 8-10.
105 Id. at 9.
106 See Nonsupplanting Requirement, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2282 (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
107 See Karl Bickel, Will the Growing Militarization of Our Police Doom Community Policing?,
COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH (Dec. 13, 2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-2013/
will the-growingmilitarization of our police doomcommunity policing.asp.
108 Id.
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3. Department of Homeland Security Grants
The DHS offers grants to state and local entities in order to
respond to possible terrorist threats and other emergencies.109
Formulated in response to recommendations of the 9/11
Commission,110 DHS has distributed over $18 billion to law
enforcement agencies since 2002.111 The original intent of the program
was to target likely terrorism targets, generally in large cities or locales
with critical infrastructure.112 However, the formula to distribute the
funds gradually came under scrutiny when Wyoming received more
antiterrorism funding per capita than New York;113 the formula has
since been changed to account for specific risk assessments but that has
not ended the controversy.114 In 2012, Senator Tom Coburn released a
report highlighting some of the grants awarded to small towns and cities
with little known risk, and accused fellow lawmakers of playing politics
in order to direct money to their own districts, despite little risk of
terror attacks in many of them.115 Still, the funding for 2014 is expected
to top $1 billion with cities like Kansas City celebrating the restoration
of antiterror funds that were briefly withheld after Coburn's report and
media scrutiny stalled their eligibility.116
Under the DHS grant program, small towns have been able to
purchase heavy military-grade vehicles and weaponry that is unlikely to
protect the population against terror attacks and much more likely to be
109 Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121
Stat. 266; FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2013 HOMELAND
SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM (HSGP) FUNDING OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT (FOA):
OVERVIEW INFORMATION (2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
20130726-1916-25045-6176/fy_2013_hsgp-foa.pdf (HSGP is managed by FEMA and covers five
projects related to emergency preparedness and counterterrorism initiatives).
110 Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
111 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY'S REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT
PROGRAM ACHIEVEMENTS 1 (2012), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/01G
12-92_junl2.pdf.
112 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2012 HOMELAND
SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM (HSGP) FUNDING OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT (FOA):
OVERVIEW INFORMATION 29-30 (2012), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/
grant/2012/fyl2_hsgp foa.pdf.
113 See Alexandra Marks, Security Funding: New York vs. Wyoming, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1024/p01s03-uspo.html.
114 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 112, at 6-8.
115 See ToM COBURN, HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMM., SAFETY AT ANY
PRICE: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SPENDING IN U.S. CITIES (2012),
available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/SenatorCoburn-UASI.pdf.
116 See Kansas City Celebrates Federal Terrorism Risk Funding, THE STREAM BLOG (Mar. 19,
2014, 7:16 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/the-stream/the-stream-officialblog/
2014/3/19/kansas-city-celebratesfederalterrorismriskfunding.html; Tom Ragan, Las Vegas to




used to execute search warrants.117 One of the stories Coburn used to
illustrate how easy it has become to get free military gear through the
DHS grant application process involves Keene, New Hampshire, where
the city of 23,000 invoked its annual pumpkin festival as a potential
terrorist target and was rewarded with a Lenco BearCat armored
personnel carrier.118 While the story garnered a good deal of scorn and
ridicule,119 there is no shortage of tenuous explanations given to acquire
these military weapons;120 one need not rely solely on this outrageous
anecdote to make the point that this hardware risks exceeding the
mandate that has traditionally driven domestic law enforcement, and
bringing about a shift from preserving the peace to engaging the enemy.
Nor does the acquisition of military equipment serve the mandate of
protecting against terrorist attacks in places where they are extremely
unlikely to occur.
Oversight for the DHS grant program has been called into question
by both members of Congressl21 and DHS's own 2012 audit. 122 Among
the charges, the audit found that DHS had no system in place to assess
whether the funded projects and equipment would assist the grantees in
preventing or responding to either terrorist attacks or any other major
emergencies.123 Moreover, grantees are not required to report any
accomplishments or show that the funding provides any enhancement
to their existing emergency preparedness abilities at all.124 DHS tracks
whether grantees bought the equipment they claimed was necessary,
however, the use of the equipment is reported in such broad terms that
it is impossible to know anything specific about what police
departments are doing with it. 125 Given such lax oversight, small towns
can purchase vehicles like BearCats and MRAPs without demonstrating
how they will be used in furtherance of the grant's priorities consistent
with protecting citizens against terrorism and other emergencies.126
117 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 31.
118 See COBURN, supra note 115, at 42.
119 See, e.g., Kari Huus, NH City's New Military Muscle Raises Some Hackles, NBC NEWS (Mar.
14, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/ news/2012/03/14/10689730-nh-citys-new-
military-muscle-raises-some-hackles; Doug Saffir, John Oliver Pulls Keene, N.H. into Police
Militarization Debate, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 18, 2014, 1:02 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/2014/08/18/john-oliver-pulls-keane-into-police-militarization-debate/nbU7y3w5j
G8W40TJpsoAL/story.html.
120 See COBURN, supra note 115, at 31-47 (citing numerous examples of cities that have no
counterterrorism use for armored vehicles and drones but received them with DHS grants,
including Clovis, California, where the city acquired a BearCat but paraded it to the local Easter
egg hunt, and a town in Washington that used its BearCat to pull over drunk drivers).
121 See generally Coburn, supra note 115.




126 See COBURN, supra note 115, at 53.
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B. Private Defense Contractors and Domestic Profits
The military equipment being used by domestic police
departments, received through federal grants like those discussed in Part
I.A, is manufactured by defense industry companies with a vested
interest in expanding into new markets.127 As the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan are winding down, some military armaments are being
destroyed to prevent their use by antigovernment forces.128 Others are
brought back to the United States and either used by the military or
transferred as surplus through the 1033 Program.129 The private defense
industryl30 stands to lose significant profits as government contracts to
fill orders decrease for wars, so the domestic market represents a new
profit frontier. Additionally, defense contractors reach out to domestic
police departments directly to sell their military equipment, whether the
departments pay with their own funds or those secured through federal
grants. Finally, police have their own lobbyists through groups like the
National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), who work to secure
government funding to purchase the vehicles, weapons, and gear
necessary to outfit SWAT teams. The cadre of financial stakeholders has
become a powerful force that continues to steer money and gear
through the green to blue pipeline.
1. Lobbying Congress
An influential voice in politics, the defense industry spent $132
million lobbying Congress in 2012,131 and contributed $27 million to
political candidates and political action committees (PACs)132 during
127 See Jon Lundberg, Challenging Times for Land Systems, but Opportunities Still Remain,
COUNTERPOINT MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.cpmil.com/news/challenging-
times-for-land-systems-but-opportunities-still-remain-2 (discussing makers of MRAPs and other
light tactical vehicles with plans to expand market share through more government contracts
despite decrease in orders for wars).
128 See Max Fisher, The US Bombing Its Own Guns Perfectly Sums up America's Total Failure in
Iraq, Vox (Aug. 8, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/8/5982501/the-us-is-now-
bombing-its-own-military-equipment-in-iraq; Ernesto Londofho, Scrapping Equipment Key to
Afghan Drawdown, WASH. POST, June 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia
pacific/scrapping-equipment-key-to-afghan-drawdown/2013/06/19/9d435258-d83f-11e2-b418-
9dfa095el25d story.html.
129 See supra Part I.A.1.a.
130 The term covers a wide range of companies that manufacture, supply, and maintain
military materiel primarily for the federal government, but also for international and private
sources.
131 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Defense: Background, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/background.php?cycle=2014&ind=D (last updated Aug.
2013).
132 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, What Is a PAC?, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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the 2012 campaign cycle.133 Over 900 lobbyists represented 266 defense
companies working to ensure that their clients' interests were
represented in Congress.134 The money spent o influence Congressional
Senate and House members is focused primarily on retaining and
securing government contracts that culminate in more profit for those
companies.135 Whether those contracts achieve profits through primary
markets like the military and police, or in the secondary market through
maintenance, the priority is to fill orders for the materiel they
produce.136
Defense industry companies lobby, contribute to PACs, and give
money directly to political campaigns; the largest recipients are those
politicians who sit on committees responsible for defense funding and
oversight.137 For example, Congressman Buck McKeon, the Chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee,138 received $567,000 from the
defense industry in the 2012 campaign cycle. 139 Dick Durbin, who chairs
the Senate Subcommittee on Defense,140 was the third biggest recipient
of defense industry money in 2014, receiving $307,899.141 Funding for
the 1033 and DHS grant programs supplies a steady flow of orders for
manufacturers of military equipment destined for American police
departments.142 In order to secure those orders, Congress must
appropriate the funding, and relies on subcommittees to make
recommendations and handle oversight.143 Of course, there is no
guarantee that a lawmaker will vote a particular way just because they
receive hefty donations, but evidence suggests that the spending pays off
for the industry. The Abrams tank is a case in point; when the Pentagon
insisted that it no longer needed or wanted General Dynamics' tank,
Congress appropriated half a billion dollars for it anyway in 2013.144
More recently in June 2014, when Congressman Alan Grayson
introduced legislation to limit the transfer of certain weapons-like







140 See Committee Assignments, U.S. SENATOR DICK DURBIN ILL.,
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/about/committees-assignments (la t visited Mar. 30, 2015).
141 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Defense: Top Recipients, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?cycle=2014&ind=D (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
142 See supra Part IA.
143 See, e.g., Committee Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/content/committee-jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 30,
2015).
144 See Anna Mulrine, Pentagon Budget Woes: Furlough Civilians, Buy Tanks You Don't Want,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0429/
Pentagon-budget-woes-furlough-civilians-buy-tanks-you-don-t-want.
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tanks, missiles, grenade launchers, and toxicological agents-through
the 1033 Program, it was soundly defeated.145 Members who voted
against the amendment received 70% more money in campaign
contributions in the previous two years than those who voted for it. 146
With more than 900 lobbyists deployed to influence Congress, and
millions spent on donations, the industry remains a powerful force.
Companies that make MRAPs, a favorite of the 1033 Program,
have spent handsomely to secure contracts. Textron, Inc., for example,
is one maker of the MRAP and spent more than $680,000 in 2014 alone
on contributions to PACs and members of Congress; it also spent nearly
$4.6 million more on lobbying efforts.147 General Dynamics, one of the
largest defense contractors in the United States, makes an MRAP and
spent more than $12 million on combined lobbying and contributions
in 2014.148 BAE Systems also makes their own version of the MRAP and
spent over $5 million on contributions and lobbying in 2014.149 The
amount spent is not tied solely to the investment return these
companies expect to gain in the domestic market; they are lobbying for
overall funding, which includes equipment destined for foreign
deployment.15o However, the domestic homeland security market
145 See H. Amdt. 918 to H.R. 4870, 113th Cong. (2014). Representative Grayson sponsored the
failed amendment o the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, which stated, in part:
[This] amendment... prohibit[s the] use of funds to transfer aircraft (including
unmanned aerial vehicles), armored vehicles, grenade launchers, silencers,
toxicological agents ... , launch vehicles, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets,
torpedoes, bombs, mines, or nuclear weapons ... through the Department of Defense
Excess Personal Property Program established pursuant to ... the 'National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.'
Id.; see also Tim Starks, Defense Industry Donations and the Alan Grayson Police Militarization
Amendment, ROLL CALL BLOG (Aug. 15, 2014, 3:07 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/five-by-five/
fergusondefense-industry-donations-and-police-militarization.
146 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 - House Vote: H. Admt. 918 (Grayson)
to H.R. 4870, MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/us-congress/bill/1 3-hr-4870/4318251/
contributions-by-vote? sort=asc&order=%24%20From%20Interest%2OGroups%3Cbr%20%2F%
3EThat%200pposed&party[D]= D&party[R]= R&party[I]= I&vote[AYE]= AYE&vote[NOE]=
NOE&vote[NV]= NV&voted with[with]= with&voted with[not-with] =not-with&state=&
customfrom=01%2F0 1%2F201 1&custom to=12%2F31%2F2013&politicians=&allpols=1 &uid=
53121&interests-support=8&interests-oppose=D2000-D3000-D5000-D9000-D8000-D4000-
D0000&from=01-01-2011&to=12-31-2013&source=pacs-nonpacs&campaign=congressional (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (showing the average campaign contributions interest groups gave House
members who voted for and against the amendment).
147 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Textron Inc: Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000201 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
148 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, General Dynamics: Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000165 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
149 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, BAE Systems: Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000583 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
150 Political spending is not broken down by issue or Congressional bill. Information is
available for specific candidates, PACs, and overall lobbying.
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represents approximately $20 billion in overall value.151 The money
spent on politicians underscores the high stakes involved in procuring
government contracts and the willingness of the industry to spend freely
to secure them.
In addition to the defense industry, trade associations-or lobbying
groups, who represent police-also lobby Congress for appropriations
that will secure both funding and equipment for their departments.152
Law enforcement lobbying focuses on programs like COPS and Byrne
JAG grant funding. 153 The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is a powerful
lobby that routinely argues in favor of the federal grant programs most
responsible for the escalation in militarized policing, arguing that they
are only trying to keep up with the kinds of weapons and gear criminals
employ. 154 In terms of needing semiautomatic handguns, the FOP might
have had a good point in the 1980s,155 but the armored tanks and the
grenade launchers transferred today are harder to justify. There are also
lobbying groups devoted primarily to securing funding and equipment
transfers solely for paramilitary units, like the NTAO. 156 These lobbyists
work to assure that money for tactical gear like ballistic vests and
helmets, tanks, APCs, M-16s, and money for salaries keep flowing from
the federal government o local law enforcement agencies.
2. Lobbying Police Departments
Defense contractors also target police departments directly to urge
them to select particular products given the number of choices that
151 See Andrew Becker & G.W. Schulz, Local Police Stockpile High-Tech, Combat-Ready Gear,
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://centerforinvestigativereporting.org/reports/local-police-stockpile-high-tech-combat-ready-
gear-2913 (citing a report by the Homeland Security Research Corporation projecting $19.2
billion in spending in 2014).
152 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database - Law Enforcement & Crime,
2014, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/issue-spec.php?%20id=LAW&
year=2014 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (listing of bills that law enforcement lobbied for and against,
including funding for COPS, anti-drug task forces, and Byrne JAG funding); see also About
NAPO, NAT'L Ass'N POLICE ORGS., http://www.napo.org/about/overview (last visited Apr. 2,
2015).
153 See About NAPO, supra note 152.
154 See Tim Devaney, Congress Under Pressure from Left and Right to 'Demilitarize' Police, HILL
(Aug. 15, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/defense/215207-left-right-unify-behind-
push-to-demilitarize-the-police#ixzz3ASqzUWM7.
155 See Lou Salseda, Double-Action, Semi-Auto Pistols Fall Out of Favor, POLICE MAG., Sept. 24,
2013, http://www.policemag.com/blog/firearms-and-tactics/story/2013/09/do-da-semi-auto-
pistols-still-belong-in-le.aspx.
156 See About NTOA, NAT'L TACTICAL OFFICERS Ass'N, http://ntoa.org/about (last visited Apr.
2,2015).
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abound.157 To further help market their wares, some companies help
police departments navigate the complicated landscape of available
federal grants. Lenco, which makes the BearCat APC, assists police
departments in drafting their grant proposals.158 Several other
companies hoping to benefit from federal grants to police departments
sponsor a website that also helps police agencies find, track, and write
grants for equipment offered by DHS and 1033 Program grants. 159 Once
police departments find the gear they want, the companies then guide
them through every step of the process, making it as easy as possible to
attain military hardware. Given that the equipment is free-or heavily
discounted depending on the grant-police departments are highly
incentivized to apply for federal grants, with the help of the
manufacturers.
Along with grant assistance, companies employ several marketing
strategies, from videos to trade shows, where they set up booths to
entice law enforcement personnel to try out the gear. 160 Lenco produced
a slick marketing video touting the BearCat, complete with an AC/DC
soundtrack and quick edits showing SWAT teams breaking down doors
with the optional battering ram attachment, wielding M-16s, and
wearing tactical ballistic vests and helmets; the police in the video look
like Marines engaged in an urban assault mission.161 Halo Corporation,
a tactical training services company, has sponsored trade shows like
"Counter-Terrorism 2012," which featured hands-on exhibits and drone
demonstrations at a San Diego resort. 162 Getting police from around the
country to attend and pay the $1000 entrance fee might seem
prohibitive, but DHS covered all travel and expenses for its existing
grant recipients.163 Another popular event held each year is called
"Urban Shield,"164 a multipurpose affair showcasing military and tactical
157 The MRAP is made by several different companies including, Safariland (formerly Armor
Holdings), BAE Systems, Force Protection, General Dynamics, Navistar, and Textron. Lenco is
the only maker of the BearCat, but it competes with makers of the MRAP for domestic law
enforcement APC market share.
158 See Lenco Armored Vehicles Grant Assistance Request Form, POLICEGRANTsHELP.COM,
http://www.policegrantshelp.com/Lenco-Armored-Vehicles/direct-grant-assistance-request-form
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
159 See POLICEGRANTsHELP.COM, http://www.policegrantshelp.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
The site is sponsored by Lenco, Taser, Night Optics, LDV specialized law enforcement vehicles,
and Argus thermal imagining equipment, among others. See id.
160 See News and Events, HALO CORP., http://www.thehalocorp.com/news-and-events (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015).
161 See Lenco BearCat G3 Armored Police Vehicles, YOUTUBE (July 22, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqZYIApWrpU&feature=share (promotional video).
162 See HALO CORP., supra note 160.
163 See COBURN, supra note 115, at 24.
164 See URBAN SHIELD, http://www.urbanshield.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
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gear from its sponsors,165 with training exercises and competitions
between SWAT teams. 166 Urban Shield's highlight video from 2009 also
features a heavy metal soundtrack and images of police in full military
gear in simulated urban warfare scenarios.167 DHS is one of the sponsors
of the event. 168 The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
has an annual exposition of its own, featuring hundreds of exhibitors
with booths showcasing their hardware and services.16 9 DHS did not
appear to pay the travel, hotel, or entrance fees for the IACP event held
in Orlando, Florida, in 2014, but it is permissible for officers to use
funds confiscated under federal forfeiture laws to attend the conference
each year.170 The marketing strategy for these events is to make the gear
and its effectiveness seem as close to a military experience as possible.171
The images, the demonstrations, and the simulations all attempt to
mirror urban warfare, not civil service.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF LEGAL REMEDIES
With Part I having laid out the key forces perpetuating police
militarization, this Part points out he inability of current legal regimes
to remedy its effects. The two Fourth Amendment avenues to challenge
the harms involved in police militarization that this Article addresses
fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the exclusionary rule. Both remedies are
165 See Vendors, URBAN SHIELD, http://www.urbanshield.org/index.php/vendors (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Urban Shield Vendors]. Event sponsors have included Blackhawk
Industries (maker of military-grade helicopters), Armored Mobility, Incorporated (makers of
ballistic shields, HaloDrop), drone manufacturers, and many others. See id.
166 See SWAT, URBAN SHIELD, http://www.urbanshield.org/index.php/2012-urban-shield-
exercise/special-wepons-and-tactics (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). According to the website for the
2014 event: "Teams will arrive on September 5, 2014, and receive mission and safety briefings as
well as an introduction to the latest technology to be used in the training scenarios." Id.
167 See Urban Shield 2009 - Highlight Video, YouTUBE (Jan. 25, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAWp-bjEAxs.
168 See Urban Shield Vendors, supra note 165.
169 See IACP 2014: Exhibitors List, IACP CONF., http://www.theiacpconference.org/iacp2014/
Public/exhibitors.aspx?ID=1219&sortMenu= 104001 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
170 See IACP 2014: Registration Categories & Fees, IACP CONF.,
http://www.theiacpconference.org/iacp20l4/Public/Content.aspx?ID=1039&sortMenu=102003
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015). Registration for the conference notes that attendees may use funds
derived from the DOJ's Asset Forfeiture Program, commonly known as the "Equitable Sharing
Program." Equitable Sharing is a mechanism through which state and local law enforcement can
claim a share of the proceeds of any property seized as part of a joint task force with a
participating federal agency, or may ask such agency to adopt a local seizure so that the local
agency can claim proceeds otherwise impermissible under state or local law. Funds distributed
under the program may be used for training purposes, like the IACP Conference. See ASSET
FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE
SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf.
171 See Becker & Schulz, supra note 151.
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designed to deter police from violating citizens' civil rights and yet both
fail to adequately address the increasingly violent and militarized nature
of police encounters.
Part II.A analyzes the current state of the law in addressing civil
claims stemming from allegations of excessive force during encounters
between citizens and police. Part JJ.B considers similar claims brought
in the context of criminal prosecutions, where defendants move to
exclude evidence by invoking the exclusionary rule under the Fourth
Amendment. Both avenues lack the necessary authority under current
constitutional interpretation to adequately address the escalation in
militarized tactics, and use of military hardware by police departments
today.
A. Fourth Amendment Challenges Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens
Section 1983 provides civil relief for excessive force claims brought
under the Fourth Amendment,172 but has failed to adequately address
the aggressive militarized SWAT raids increasingly used to conduct
searches. In order to prevail on a claim for damages under Section 1983,
a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state law-and
not protected by qualified immunity-deprived the plaintiff of a clearly
established constitutional right.173 Establishing a constitutional violation
is not enough to prevail on a claim; the court must also find that a
reasonable officer would have known that his actions violated a clearly
established law under the circumstances to overcome a claim of
qualified immunity.174 Determining whether the law was clearly
established can be difficult in cases involving excessive force, which are
fact specific, unless precedent exists to hold that a particular action
violated a constitutional right.175 Without precedent, the analysis
becomes more difficult and remedies are much harder to attain for an
aggrieved plaintiff.176 The problems inherent in finding precedent, in
order to apply the requisite standards to specific case facts, are myriad
172 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (applying qualified immunity to federal agents while 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 applies to state claims).
173 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). These are Bivens actions for
federal officers.
174 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
175 See generally Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405 (2012) (noting that when
courts find that a law was not clearly established before addressing whether a constitutional
violation occurred, the law never becomes clearly established because precedent is never made
regarding a particular action).
176 But see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ("[I]t is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.").
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and have been addressed exhaustively by scholars. 177 It is not within the
purview of this Article to cover the same ground or suggest a better
methodology for courts to apply. Instead, the focus here is to
demonstrate how the law, as currently constructed and applied, fails to
properly analyze and remedy excessive force claims in the context of
military police tactics, particularly as applied to SWAT raids. This
Section situates and highlights the problem in order to demonstrate the
current inability of the justice system to address the increased aggressive
and excessive force used in those kinds of paramilitary raids.
Because courts are permitted to find qualified immunity before
considering the merits of an excessive force claim, it has become
difficult to create precedent. When a plaintiff brings a tort claim under
the Fourth Amendment against state or federal officers, two issues come
into play: (1) the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claim; and (2)
the defendant's right to invoke qualified immunity.178 In order to
overcome a claim to qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's actions were inconsistent with those of an objectively
reasonable officer under the circumstances, and were in abrogation of
clearly established law.179 Qualified immunity provides an opportunity
to avoid trial on the merits. Therefore, the possibility that qualified
immunity is found at the summary judgment stage-based on a lack of
clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would be aware-
creates an obstacle for plaintiffs hoping to rely on precedent.iso If the
law must be clearly established in order for the case to be heard on the
merits, creating precedent for future cases becomes far more difficult.181
In Saucier v. Katz,182 the Supreme Court attempted to address that
problem by requiring a two-step procedure in which the merits of the
constitutional claim are considered first, before reaching the qualified
immunity question. 183 It held that if a court then found a constitutional
violation, the court should consider whether qualified immunity
applied.184 In doing so, the Court hoped to provide some ground on
which precedents could be developed for future clarity. 185 However, the
requirements laid out in Saucier have since been rescinded and the two-
177 See generally Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REv. 761 (2012);
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115;
Leong, supra note 175.
178 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802-03.
179 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 801.
180 See Jeffries, supra note 177, at 120; Leong, supra note 175.
181 See Jeffries, supra note 177, at 120; Leong, supra note 175, at 411.
182 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
183 See id.
184 See id. at 201.
185 See id.
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step process made discretionary. 186 So once again, courts may not reach
the merits of a claim before finding qualified immunity applies, making
it difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that the law violated was clearly
established. 187
If claims of excessive force do not find their way into established
precedent, plaintiffs who seek a remedy under Section 1983 for such
claims must rely more heavily on decisions from criminal cases in which
exclusion was sought as a remedy.188 However, in criminal cases, use of
force is often overlooked as a "manner" violation, not germane to the
issue of exclusion, as further discussed below.189 In addition, courts are
far less likely to find in favor of defendants in cases where suppressing
evidence is the remedy. This leaves the Section 1983 plaintiff wanting
for precedent to overcome the need for "clearly established" law. 190
Alternative tort remedies remain elusive, given that the Supreme
Court has made clear that excessive force claims must be analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment.191 Yet, because the standard for both qualified
immunity and excessive force-objective reasonableness-is both fact
driven and based on the general principle of reasonableness,192 finding
clearly established precedents is difficult. 193 In attempting to parse the
two types of reasonableness, courts will often look for precedent that
matches the facts exactly, or apply a very broad reasonable force test;
both analyses present a high bar to plaintiffs. 194
Even where clearly established law may exist for a claim of
excessive force, the damages may be hard to quantify in monetary terms.
This leaves courts unable to furnish a remedy for individual acts of
unreasonable force in which humiliation, degradation, and disrespect
are the outcomes, rather than a damaged front door or physical
186 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (recognizing the importance of developing
precedent, the Court nonetheless held that precedent would be created in the criminal context,
thus feeding the civil one).
187 See id. at 224-25 (suggesting criminal realm would provide precedent).
188 But see Daniel K. Siegel, Clearly Established Enough: The Fourth Circuit's New Approach to
Qualified Immunity in Bellotte v. Edwards, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2012) (analogizing to cases that
were distinguishable from the case at bar in order to deny qualified immunity and find clearly
established law).
189 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829 (9th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1034 (2008); United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2000);
see also supra Part I.B.2.
190 See Leong, supra note 175, at 411-12.
191 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
192 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see also Leong, supra note 175, at 446 (noting that
the Court distinguished Garner and failed to apply the factors in Graham, which included a list of
actions constituting excessive force; instead, the Court applied a general balancing test weighing
public safety against the individual).
193 See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 118 (2009); Leong, supra
note 175, at 448-49.
194 See Leong, supra note 175, at 447.
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injury. 195 If the court can furnish only two remedies-money or
suppression of evidence-this may leave the individual victim of
excessive force without remedy and further fails to regulate or deter uses
of force.196 For example, the use of a flash-bang197 grenade during the
execution of a raid might be extremely unpleasant-it might even
damage the carpet or the furniture-but for the plaintiff seeking a
Section 1983 remedy, the monetary value might be quite small.198
Prevailing in such a situation would be difficult even if the plaintiff
could show that the officers behaved unreasonably in using a flash-bang
and that using it violated clearly established law, since there is no
remedy to extract from the officers. Plaintiffs could bring the action
against the municipality, but there they have to prove the police acted
within established policy or custom.199 Plaintiffs in search of precedent
might then turn to the criminal realm where a similar case might have
been adjudicated under the exclusionary rule, but there, the obstacle is
the likely presence of contraband; in such cases it is far more likely that
the use of a flash-bang would be considered reasonable after the
application of the reasonableness test.200 Thus, a gap exists in
constitutional tort law in terms of providing proper remedies and
deterrents where police officers use excessive force.
B. Fourth Amendment Challenges Under the Exclusionary Rule
Fourth Amendment challenges that seek the remedy of exclusion
do not bar the petitioner from constitutional tort claims but are
necessarily the product of criminal prosecutions in which evidence was
195 But see Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In Floyd, a section
1983 claim was made on behalf of several petitioners seeking injunctive relief to halt arbitrary and
race-based stop-and-frisk efforts in New York City. See id. The city was ordered to remedy the
program and is currently doing so, having dropped its appeal when a new Mayor, Bill DeBlasio,
took office in 2014. See Floyd, et. al. v. City of New York, et al., CENTER CONST. RTs.,
http://ccrjustice.org/stopandfrisk (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
196 See infra Part III.A for examples.
197 "Flash-Bangs are used by special tactical units during hostage rescue and high-risk
warrants. It is an ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] controlled Class-C explosive
device that emits a bright light and thunderous noise to distract potentially dangerous
individuals." See Flash Bangs, COMBINED SYs., https://www.combinedsystems.com/products/?
cid=92 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (manufacturer of flash-bang grenades).
198 But see Alexis Stevens, Toddler Critically Injured by "Flash-Bang" During Police Search,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 30, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/breaking-news/
toddler-critically-injured-by-flash-bang-during-po/nf9XM.
199 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
200 See United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding use of flash-bang
device unreasonable).
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obtained.201 Like Section 1983 claims, Fourth Amendment motions to
suppress now depend almost entirely on a general balancing test with
reasonableness as a guiding principle.202 Probable cause is generally still
required for search warrants, but given that search warrants make up
only approximately 1% of all searches, most searches are subject only to
the general balancing test.203 Even so, there is no longer a bright
separation between cases in which warrants were obtained and those
that do not involve a warrant. The analysis is now the same and deals
only with whether the search was reasonable, balancing the interests of
the individual against that of the government.204 This is so whether the
court is analyzing a violation involving the manner in which the search
was undertaken, or one in which a violation of the scope of the search is
claimed.205 In other words, courts will look at what was searched and the
manner in which the search was conducted, determining the
reasonableness of each, depending on the requested relief. If a scope
violation occurs, exclusion is a possible remedy.206 However, if a manner
violation is found, the only remedy available is a civil action under
Section 1983.207 As discussed above, the deterrent effects of qualified
immunity and lack of precedent to show clearly established law
violations make remedies for manner violations extremely difficult to
obtain.
Where the Fourth Amendment violation consists of excessive
force, suppression is not an available remedy as long as the scope of the
search is found to be reasonable.208 Where the Supreme Court once
presumed warrantless searches unreasonable and applied the
exclusionary rule, codified in modern jurisprudence in the seminal case
Katz v. United States209 the Court no longer makes that presumption.210
In Katz, the officers were found to have acted reasonably, and yet the
remedy was exclusion because they lacked a warrant.211 Where there is
201 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to state courts);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (applying exclusionary rule to federal courts),
overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
202 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
203 See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1609,
1666 (2012).
204 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
205 See Richard M. Re, Comment, United States v. Ankeny: Remedying the Fourth
Amendment's Reasonable Manner Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 723 (2008).
206 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding deterrence as goal in finding
exclusion inappropriate for good faith violation of scope).
207 Id.
208 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829 (9th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1034 (2008).
209 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
210 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 586.
211 See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68
U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 595 (2014).
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no warrant to search, the scope of a search is permissible as long as it is
reasonable under the circumstances.212 Even the requirement of
probable cause is virtually usurped by exceptions,213 and more recently
in Samson v. California,214 ignored altogether.215 It then follows that the
manner in which the search is conducted is also analyzed using the same
reasonableness standard as in warrantless searches. So too, where a
warrant defines the scope of a search, the manner becomes irrelevant for
purposes of exclusion. The Supreme Court has held, in two recent cases,
that exclusion is a last resort and not a presumptive remedy.216 For
manner violations, the lack of precedent is a clear impediment to
providing both remedies and incentives to reform policy regarding
SWAT raids and aggressive tactics.
Some judges have attempted to address the gap into which
excessive force falls, but their views currently appear solely in dissents.217
The dissents in Hudson and Ankeny have suggested that exclusion is the
only remedy for excessive force violations.218 Still, the Court precedents
have been clear that where evidence would have been obtained
anyway,219 exclusion is not the proper remedy for a claim of excessive
force;220 only constitutional tort law can provide relief.221 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has been clear in a number of cases related to its
reluctance to suppress evidence in excessive force cases, that
suppression is either inappropriate or ineffective for purposes of
deterrence.222 In Hudson, Justice Scalia found that the cost of
suppressing evidence far outweighed the deterrent benefit it might
produce, given that police are better disciplined and trained today than
they were in 1961, at the time Mapp v. Ohio223 was decided. He went
further, finding that "[m]assive deterrence is hardly required" for
violations of the "knock-and-announce" rule224-in which officers must
212 Id. at 600-02.
213 Id. at 603-08.
214 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
215 Kamin & Marceau, supra note 211, at 606.
216 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 135 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586
(2006).
217 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 604, 608-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Ankeny, 502
F.3d 829, 841-42 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1034 (2008).
218 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 608-09; Ankeny, 502 F.3d at 842-43.
219 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (establishing the doctrine of inevitable
discovery in which the exclusionary rule does not apply to cases in which constitutional violations
are found if police would have discovered the evidence absent the violation in any event).
220 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41 (1988).
221 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 586; Ankeny, 502 F.3d at 829.
222 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363
(1998)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
223 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-99.
224 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596; see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding that Fourth
Amendment incorporates common law requirement that police knock and announce identity as
police before forcibly entering dwelling).
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identify themselves as such before breaching the door to serve a
warrant-since it would only prevent the obtainment of evidence and
jeopardize the safety of officers.225 Finding that civil tort claims were the
proper remedy for such violations, Scalia conceded that the Court is
unaware of whether violations of the "knock-and-announce" rule have
been successful in the civil context but cited to a few cases pending
before federal courts to show that such suits are possible, and stated that
given the lack of evidence, the Court can assume such suits will be given
their proper due process in civil courts.226 The majority did not address
the problem of creating "clearly established" law as it did in Pearson v.
Callahan,227 when it suggested that criminal cases would provide the
ground on which Section 1983 cases could stand to find precedent.228
However, the dissenters in Hudson argued that not only could
suppression be a deterrent in a case involving violation of the "knock-
and-announce" rule, but also that despite Scalia's assertion that such
violations do not represent systemic problems, the evidence is just the
opposite. Violations, they found, "are legion."229 Further, the dissenters
argued that the lack of monetary damages should lead the Court to
conclude that suppression is the only remedy.230
The doctrine of inevitable discovery231 leaves excessive force claims
without a home, or at least in a home with a rickety roof. Moreover, the
balancing test applied to exclusion analysis-deterrence effects against
social costs-leaves most claimants without a remedy for aggressive
SWAT raids. Therefore, attempting to address excessive force and the
rise of militarization as a systemic problem using Fourth Amendment
remedies is simply ineffective. There is nothing in current Fourth
Amendment precedent hat declares a tank cannot be used to break up a
poker game. While such activity may seem unreasonable, there is
nothing unconstitutional about it. Where courts address excessive force
at all232-generally in cases in which nothing illegal was found-the only
issue is whether damages can be obtained for the harm caused in a civil
cause of action.233 Even then, if courts find that officers had a reasonable
225 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596.
226 See id. at 598.
227 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
228 See id. at 242.
229 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 610.
230 See id. at 611 ("To argue that there may be few civil suits because violations may produce
nothing more than nominal injury is to confirm, not to deny, the inability of civil suits to deter
violations." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
231 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
232 See Leong, supra note 175, at 440-41 (citing numerous instances in which force is not
addressed in analysis while focus placed entirely on scope of search).
233 See United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2000). Despite the Court's
assertion that "police cannot automatically throw bombs into drug dealers' houses, even if the
bomb goes by the euphemism 'flash-bang device,"' the Court did not rule that exclusion was the
proper remedy because it had no effect on the inevitable discovery of the evidence obtained. Id.
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fear that led to the use of the force, there is no remedy at all, even if
someone is killed during a poker raid, for example.234 The very lack of
definition given to "reasonableness" in Fourth Amendment analysis
means that other solutions must be sought if the rising incidents of force
are to be curbed. In many instances, force is not addressed at all. 235 Even
where courts find excessive force problematically related to a search, the
prevailing law does not provide for exclusion as long as the scope of the
search is found to have been reasonable.236
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARIZATION AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES
As indicated in Part II, current legal regimes can do little to remedy
the harms created by militarization. Part III seeks to demonstrate that
there is a need for remedy, and to explore possible approaches.
Due to the nature of policing and the potential for an encounter
between suspect and officer to result in arrest and incarceration, some
interactions can escalate resulting in injury to either party; however, the
DOJ does not keep statistics on police misconduct or excessive force
complaints.237 Since there are no statistics tracking use of force
complaints nationwide, there is no way to know whether their
prevalence is increasing or whether incidents are more violent, resulting
in more severe injuries. Even if one examines only those encounters of
which there is some publicly available documentation, however, one
realizes that the consequences of militarization are disturbing and that
reform is necessary.
Part III.A aims to convey a sense of the variety and risks of
militarized encounters, by describing a sample of the encounters and the
relatively new tactics being employed with regularity, amplified by
weaponry and militarized training. Domestic police have access to
hardware that has traditionally been reserved for military use, and that
access continues to expand238 but understanding both how this
hardware influences behavior and the purposes for which it is deployed
is also vital to assessing whether police have transformed their mission
from protectors of the community to soldiers fighting a war against it.
In light of Part II's analysis of the gap in judicial response, Part III.B
234 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Because the Court uses a general balancing test
rather than a list that includes officer safety as one of a number of factors, officer safety weighs
more heavily in favor of government interest against individual interest. Id.
235 See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998) (holding that the only matter in issue
was whether forcible entry was justified but not the manner in which it was effectuated).
236 See United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829, 841-42 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (taking holistic approach), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1034 (2008).
237 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 29 (citing the areas covered by the DOJ and the Bureau
of Justice Statistics).
238 See supra Part IA.
1816 [Vol. 36:1785
THE GREEN TO BLUE PIPELINE
looks beyond the justice system, at the ongoing efforts to demilitarize
the police in several federal, state, and local jurisdictions around the
country. It offers insight into the struggle to reverse the trend of arming
the police with military weaponry, and to craft policy solutions to
address the military tactics increasingly being employed by police
officers.
A. Blurring the Lines Between Military and Police: Deadly Outcomes
"Dynamic entry" raids239 have become an integral part of SWAT
tactics, even when police have no information to conclude that officers
might be in danger.240 They are employed for drug raids where
marijuana possession is suspected, where a suspect is wanted but not
known to be armed; even knock-and-announce warrants can become
no-knock raids if officers on the scene have a reasonable fear that they
might be in danger.241 Part III.A.1 discusses incidents that have occurred
since federal grant programs and militarized training have come into
being that have resulted in disastrous results for suspects, innocent
civilians, and officers.242 These incidents underscore the thesis of this
Article: that militarization in both tactics and equipment has led to an
escalation of violent encounters between citizens and police that is not
being addressed by the justice system and requires holistic action.243
The consequences of both military training and the use of weapons
designed for war have created an atmosphere in which police-citizen
encounters too often escalate and become violent. Part III.A.2 addresses
escalation of police confrontations with alleged suspects and how the
mandate of the police appears to have shifted from keeping peace to
engaging the enemy, with an inherent fear and distrust on the part of
239 See Glenn French, Dynamic Entry Versus Deliberate Entry, POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.policeone.com/SWAT/articles/2154851-Dynamic-entry-versus-deliberate-entry.
Dynamic entry relies on surprise, speed, and domination marked by a quick entry, use of
diversionary devices when warranted, and overwhelming dominating force. See id.
240 See Radley Balko, Troubling New Details About the Violent Police Raid in Iowa, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/02/05/troubling-
new-details-about-the-violent-police-raid-in-iowa (discussing incident in which police executed a
"knock-and-announce" warrant with dynamic entry looking for different suspect wanted for
alleged credit card fraud).
241 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (holding that failure to knock-and-
announce does not trigger exclusion of evidence because of the inevitable discovery doctrine,
when police had a warrant requiring that they knock and announce themselves but failed to do so
citing safety concerns). The Court held that police may determine whether to knock and
announce their presence before a dynamic entry, based on the circumstances at the time. See id. at
589-90.
242 See Botched Paramilitary Police Raids: An Epidemic of "Isolated Incidents," CATO INST.,
http://www.cato.org/raidmap (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
243 See infra Part II.B.
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police that seems more akin to soldiers facing suspected insurgents in
wartime. This Subpart questions the training that influences and
sustains a culture of militarism that infects even simple encounters with
police.
Police now use paramilitary units to carry out raids on unlikely
targets, expanding their traditional function to nonemergency
investigations with little oversight. SWAT raids have been deployed to
investigate organic farms, nightclubs, barbershops, and even poker
games. Part I.A.3 addresses some of the expanded uses of SWAT
teams to handle nonviolent investigations and arrests, from regulatory
violations to administrative searches. Given that federal grant programs
require the use of the equipment that they fund and transfer, this
practice is not surprising. Moreover, policies governing the use of
SWAT teams are scant, so there is little oversight either on the federal,
state, or local level to determine when and how to deploy them.
1. SWAT Raids
The original purpose of SWAT was to respond to active shooters,
barricaded suspects, and hostage situations;244 that purpose has now
been extended to include service of search warrants, which now
comprise 79% of all SWAT deployments, 60% of them for drugs.245
Between 2011 and 2013, only 7% of SWAT deployments were executed
for hostage or active shooter scenarios.246 As recently as about twenty-
five years ago, use of SWAT for drug searches of private homes was
extremely rare and considered highly dangerous and unnecessary.247
Today, with military training and hardware, police deploy SWAT for
even low-level drug possession searches and sometimes the
consequences are deadly for the suspects, their families, their pets,2 4 8
and even for the police.249 Moreover, BearCats, MRAPs, and other APCs
244 See Kraska, supra note 8, at 8.
245 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 5, 38.
246 Id.
247 See Kraska, supra note 8, at 8.
248 See, e.g., David Heinzmann, Family Gets $333,000 for 2009 Raid in Which Cops Killed Dog,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-19/news/ct-met-police-
shoot-dog-20110819_I-family-dog-damages-officers (SWAT raid found neither drugs nor
criminal activity but shot dog after resident offers to lock it up and officers refuse).
249 See Rachel Cox, Man Accused of Killing Veteran SWAT Officer Returns to Court, KWTX
NEWS 10 (June 19, 2014), http://www.kwtx.com/home/headlines/Killeen-Man-Charged-In-
Veteran-SWAT-Officers-Shooting-Death-263742841.html (stating that Detective Charles
Dinwiddie was killed executing a "no-knock" warrant when the homeowner shot him as he
climbed through the window); see also Radley Balko, Some Justice in Texas: The Raid on Henry
Magee, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/02/
10/some-justice-in-texas-the-raid-on-henry-magee (where informant told police that they would
find ten to twelve large marijuana plants, stolen guns, and a vicious dog at the residence;
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are used routinely in SWAT raids in many jurisdictions.250 Rolling tank-
like vehicles through neighborhoods at night to execute search warrants
for nonviolent offenses has proven unnecessary in most instances, given
the number of deployments in which they were not used for anything
other than transport.251
"No-knock" warrant executions present particularly dangerous
circumstances for both police and suspects since they permit a forced,
"dynamic" entry without prior identification of the officers.252 Sixty
percent of such warrants are used to search for drugs.253 In some cases,
the results are deadly.254 In others, such raids can be terrifying and cause
serious injury. A SWAT team in Cornelia, Georgia, with a population
under 5000, executed a "no-knock" raid looking for a man who had
allegedly sold an informant methamphetamine.255 During their
"dynamic entry," an officer threw a flash-bang grenade-intended to
distract and startle the residents-into a crib where a nineteen-month
old baby was sleeping.256 The child was severely injured and transported
to a hospital where he was placed in a medically induced coma.257 The
suspect was not home at the time; only his family visiting from out of
town was present. No drugs or weapons were recovered during the
raid.258 In fact, according to police, the suspect did not live there and
was arrested later at his home without incident.259 Despite the severe
injuries to the child, which required weeks in hospital, the county has
determined that it is not going to pay any medical bills,260 leaving the
family with a constitutional tort claim under Section 1983 as their only
homeowner shot one officer as they breached his door and was charged with capital murder but a
grand jury declined to indict).
250 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 38 (citing New Haven, Connecticut, Allentown,
Pennsylvania, and Unified Police Department, Utah, as examples where SWAT teams are
deployed routinely).
251 See id.
252 See Kraska, supra note 8, at 7.
253 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 33.
254 See Matt Agorist, Police Officer Shot and Killed During No-Knock Raid,
THEFREETHOUGHTPROJECT.COM (May 12, 2014), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/police-
officer-shot-killed-no-knock-raid (citing two separate cases in which police officers were killed
during such raids).
255 See Stevens, supra note 198.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See Alecia Phonesavanh, A Swat Team Blew a Hole in My 2-Year-Old Son, SALON (June 24,
2014, 7:45 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/06/24/a swat team blew a hole inmy_2_year
old son.
259 See M. Alex Johnson, 'Militarized' SWAT Teams Under Scrutiny as Toddler Recovers from
Grenade, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2014, 9:41 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
militarized-swat-teams-under-scrutiny-toddler-recovers-grenade-nl50246.
260 See Radley Balko, The Drug War Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, WASH. POST,





recourse. The visiting family came to stay after their out-of-state home
was destroyed in a fire, so it is quite possible that the police did not
know a child was present, and therefore might successfully argue that
the officers' actions were reasonable.261 This episode raises real and
grave concerns about using explosives and dangerous ordnance
developed for the battlefield in the course of investigating nonviolent
crimes that do not pose immediate public safety risks, like drug activity.
Even in "knock-and-announce" raids, results can be disastrous,
especially given that the entry can follow only a few seconds after the
announcement.2 6 2 In 2013, the Los Angeles SWAT team conducted a
raid on the home of Eugene Mallory after an officer reported smelling
chemicals downwind from the eighty-year-old man's house.263 Mallory
was shot in his bed but, as an audio recording revealed, the police officer
shot him six times before telling him to drop his gun, which was found
on his bedside table.264 No methamphetamine was recovered. No
officers were disciplined or charged in the incident. In 2011, Jose
Guerena was killed when a Pinal County SWAT team conducted a raid
on his home, executing a warrant primarily focused on his brother's
alleged drug activity.265 His wife heard a noise and saw a man outside
their window; Guerena told her to hide with their four-year-old son in a
closet where she called 911 and stayed on the recorded line throughout
the incident.266 Sirens were engaged on an APC, and concussion
grenades were set off in the yard seven seconds before the door was
breached; Guerena had grabbed his rifle, but the safety was engaged.267
He was shot sixty times.268 His brother was not found at the residence
and no drugs were found.269 Incidents like these call into question the
efficacy of conducting such raids where homeowners are surprised,
children are present, and the information is murky, as in the Guerena
261 See supra Part II.A for an explanation of the standard for qualified immunity.
262 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The police waited three to five seconds and
the Court held that there should be no time limit but that cases should be decided based on the
totality of the circumstances. See id. at 588.
263 See Zach Weissmueller, Video: Police Shoot, Kill 80-Year-Old Man in His Own Bed, Don't
Find the Drugs They Were Looking for, REASON.COM HIT & RUN BLOG (Feb. 15, 2014, 3:00 PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2014/02/15/yet-another-example-of-why-americas-drug.
264 Id.
265 See Fernanda Echavarri, SWAT Raid Fatal Drama is Revealed in 911 Call, ARIz. DAILY
STAR (May 14, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://tucson.com/news/local/crime/swat-raid-fatal-drama-is-
revealed-in-call/article b3177522-baao-5c9e-9fOd-d3d7da6e9e4b.html; Amanda Lee Myers, Jose
Guerena Ortiz, Killed by SWAT Team, Was Trying to Protect His Family, Wife Says, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 28, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/28/jose-guerena-ortiz-
killed n 1116239.html.
266 Echavarri, supra note 265.
267 See id. Police originally claimed he fired on them until an investigation revealed the safety
was engaged and no shots were fired. See id.
268 Id.
269 See id.; Myers, supra note 265.
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case. It subsequently came to light that investigating officers knew little
about Guerena or that he had a regular work schedule; the warrant
claimed surveillance had been done and that Guerena never went to
work, which militated in favor of the assumption that he was dealing
drugs with his brother.270 Even when surveillance is done and the
information obtained is reliable, night raids on unsuspecting civilians
are highly dangerous and yet often such raids-and the warrants that
facilitate them-are based on shoddy information and lead to the deaths
of innocents.271
Even raids that do not end with the death of a person can cause
great emotional harm that the justice system does not remedy because
of the expansive discretion afforded police in how they carry out
searches.272 When a SWAT team in Columbia, Missouri-wearing
BDUs and ballistic helmets, and armed with assault weapons-executed
a nighttime raid on Jonathon Whitworth's home to look for marijuana,
they first shot the family dog as Whitworth opened the door, and then
held his wife and seven-year-old son at gunpoint while they searched for
large marijuana plants and guns.273 The entire entry was video-recorded
by the police.274 Whitworth was charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia and fined $300.275 His Section 1983 case was dismissed.276
270 See Morgan Loew, Depositions Show Contradictions in Fatal SWAT Raid, CBS 5 AZ KPHO
(Dec. 2, 2013, 10:09 PM), http://www.kpho.com/story/20142545/depositions-show-
contradictions-in-fatal-swat-raid. Officers gave conflicting accounts in depositions regarding
Guerena's involvement in his brother's alleged drug activity, including saying that he was
surveilled over a six-month period and never went to a job when in fact he had worked at a
copper mine for more than a year, working the night shift. See id. He was sleeping when the raid
occurred at 9:30 AM. See Echavarri, supra note 265.
271 See Liz Fabian, Attorney Alleges 'Invalid' Warrant Led to Laurens Deputies Killing East
Dublin Man, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.macon.com/2014/10/01/3338309_attorney-
alleges-warrant-problems.html?rh=1. David Hooks was killed in a nighttime SWAT raid when the
man who burglarized Mr. Hooks' car two days earlier was arrested and told police that the
methamphetamine recovered in the car belonged to his victim, Mr. Hooks. See id. Police obtained
a "knock-and-announce" warrant and raided Hooks' home that night. See id. His wife thought the
burglars had returned when she saw men in camouflage outside their home and woke her
husband who grabbed his gun. See id. She reported that no announcement was made and police
shot Hooks upon entering and seeing his gun. See id. Police searched the home for forty-four
hours and recovered nothing. See id.
272 See supra Part II.A.
273 See SWAT Narcotics Raid in Columbia, Missouri, YouTUBE (May 9, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24tYWMWVEto [hereinafter SWAT Narcotics Raid,
Columbia]; see also Radley Balko, A Drug Raid Goes Viral, REASON.COM (May 11, 2010),
http://reason.com/archives/2010/05/11/a-drug-raid-goes-viral. An informant told police
Whitworth had large marijuana plants in his home eight days prior to the raid. See Balko, supra.
274 See SWAT Narcotics Raid, Columbia, supra note 273. Audio includes sounds of both dogs
being shot and whimpering. See id.
275 See Balko, supra note 273. Possession of marijuana for personal use was decriminalized in
Missouri. See id.
276 See P.M. ex rel. Whitworth v. Bolinger, No. 2:10-CV-04208-NKL, 2011 WL 5838406
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2011).
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The judge found that the police officers' actions were reasonable.277
Whitworth alleged that he was kicked in the face when he put his hands
behind his head instead of his back as commanded.278 His wife and son
were held in a squad car sobbing for two hours while animal control
removed their dead dog, and the mother's request to have a relative
come pick up the child and remove him from the traumatic situation
was denied.279 Still, granting qualified immunity to the defendants, the
court found every single action by police officers in that case reasonable
and dismissed the case on summary judgment.28o Moreover, the court
found that the city had no obligation to make changes to its policies
governing dynamic entries since it found no liability on the part of any
officer.281 This case is illustrative of how the law fails to address manner
violations appropriately, the consequence of which is failure to change
policies about the appropriate use of paramilitary forces. The police had
received a tip from an informant eight days prior to the raid about
marijuana plants, yet the police chose to stage a dynamic nighttime
SWAT raid.
When police raid the wrong address, the strategy of using
paramilitary tactics and "dynamic" entry is terrifying for the innocent
home dweller.282 It should call into question the policy of such raids,
usually executed at night with the potential for disastrous results, but
police continue to conduct them at an alarming rate nonetheless.283
Jessica Walker was home with her four children getting ready to take a
bath when the Bakersfield, California, SWAT team executed a "no-
knock" warrant at night, using their battering ram to breach her security
door.284 With Walker half dressed, police forced her to the floor at
gunpoint while her children screamed; eventually, police learned that
the apartment they wanted to search was, in fact, next door.285 Such
botched raids have become ubiquitous in recent years,286 with
277 Id. at *6.
278 Id. at *2, *5.
279 Id. at *3.
280 Id. at *1, *5.
281 Id. at *7 (citing Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007)) (holding
that individual liability must attach before municipal liability may be considered).
282 For more examples of wrong-address raids, see Wrong Address, POLICE STATE USA,
http://www.policestateusa.com/tag/wrong-address (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
283 See Kraska, supra note 8.
284 See Cris Ornelas, Bakersfield Police Ram Down Door of Wrong Apartment in Search for a
Suspect, 23ABC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://www.turnto23.com/news/local-news/
bakersfield-police-ram-down-door-of-wrong-apartment-in-search-for-a-suspect-042414.
285 See id.
286 See Botched Paramilitary Police Raids, supra note 242; see also Jaywon Choe & Michael
Brendan Dougherty, 9 Horrifying Botched Police Raids, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2012, 12:52 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/9-horrifying-botched-police-raids-2012-2; Jodie Gummow, 11
Over-the-Top U.S. Police Raids that Victimized Innocents, SALON (Aug. 29, 2013, 8:40 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/08/29/11_over-the-top u s-police raids that victimized
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paramilitary SWAT raids becoming a routine manner in which to serve
search warrants in suspected drug cases.287
2. Escalation and Violent Encounters
When police are trained to view themselves as soldiers, it is
unsurprising that hey sometimes treat encounters with suspects as an
engagement with the enemy.288 The "war on drugs" has influenced
training and deployment tactics by defining the landscape as a war and
police officers as fighters in it.289 Similarly, the "war on terrorism" has
created yet another domestic warfront in which trainers encourage
police officers to fight as soldiers on a battlefield.290 Within a culture of
battle, war, and combat, police are trained to engage with the
communities they serve and face adversity the same way a soldier
might.291 Police officers are trained using a stress-based military
curriculum in the academy,292 and they also sometimes train with the
military directly.293 The fear-based mentality that stress-based training
encourages can lead to escalation during police-citizen encounters that
innocents; No-Knock Raid, POLICE STATE USA, http://www.policestateusa.com/tag/no-knock-raid
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015); SWAT Narcotics Raid, Columbia, supra note 273.
287 See Kraska, supra note 8.
288 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 18 (noting that most police academies employ a
military-style, stress-based training curriculum); see also id. at 23 (citing training manual for
Carey, North Carolina, SWAT team entitled, "Steel Your Battlemind," in which officers are told to
face their fear with the mindset of a soldier at war).
289 See id. at 18 (citing Sargent Glenn French, a Sterling Heights, Michigan, police officer and
trainer who wrote, "'We trainers have spent the past decade trying to ingrain in our students the
concept that the American police officer works a battlefield every day he patrols his sector"'); see
also Glenn French, Police Militarization and an Argument in Favor of Black Helicopters,
POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.policeone.com/SWAT/articles/6385683-Police-mil
(arguing that police face the same dangers on the streets as soldiers do in war).
290 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 23 (citing a presentation at a conference sponsored by
International Association of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors, in which police are
encouraged to think like soldiers and explaining that because U.S. law prohibits the military from
addressing attacks on the homeland, police are "our Delta force").
291 Id. A lieutenant with the Albuquerque, New Mexico, police department advertised classes
to members of the department on the subject of "killology," or "the study of killing." See Radley
Balko, Albuquerque Police Lieutenant Advertises "Killology" Classes, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/11/20/albuquerque-police-lieutenant-
advertises-killology-classes. Notably, this advertisement was sent out just after the city signed a
consent decree with the DOJ agreeing to reform its aggressive policing tactics. Id.
292 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 18.
293 See John Monk, COLUMBIA, SC: Richland Deputies, U.S. Military Carry Out Secretive-
And Noisy-Joint Exercise Monday and Tuesday, PREPPER PODCAST RADIO NETWORK (Jan. 21,
2014), http://prepperpodcast.com/columbia-sc-richland-deputies-u-s-military-carry-out-
secretive-and-noisy-joint-exercise-monday-and-tuesday/#axzz3WDFamkpZ (Columbia, South
Carolina, police conducted secret trainings with military personnel at Fort Bragg Army base,
home to Delta Force).
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leaves both vulnerable to sustaining injury.294 Given that courts award
great deference to police in excessive force cases when they claim to
have been in fear, this training only exacerbates the problem for
plaintiffs seeking redress through constitutional tort remedies.295
When police encounter people with physical or mental
impairments, the fear-based military culture instilled in them can test
the little patience they may have for getting a suspect to comply quickly
enough, which can lead to death or to injury.296 James Boyd was a
mentally disturbed homeless man who was camping in the foothills of
Arizona illegally. 297 Police in tactical gear, carrying assault rifles, arrived
and attempted to frisk him, but he claimed to be a government agent
and threatened them verbally. 298 During a three-hour confrontation-all
of which is available on video299-officers stood down the hill from him;
Boyd told officers he feared that they would shoot him and refused to
come down. They assured him that they would not, and he finally
agreed to walk down the hill and come with them, picking up his bags.
Just then, an officer yelled, "Do it!" and a flash-bang was thrown at
Boyd, who reached into his pocket for what police say was a knife. He
was then shot multiple times, attacked by a police dog, and then shot
multiple times with bean bag rounds; he died the next day.300 The
Albuquerque Police Department cleared all of the officers involved and
found the shooting justified because the officers deemed Boyd a
threat.301 The incident capped a string of police shootings in
Albuquerque, in which twenty-five people were killed in four years.302
The DOJ sent a letter to Albuquerque's mayor two weeks after Boyd was
killed, finding that police in Albuquerque had engaged in a pattern or
294 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 23.
295 See supra Part II.A for an explanation of the standard for reasonable conduct on the part of
police.
296 See Kelley Bouchard, Across Nation, Unsettling Acceptance when Mentally Ill in Crisis Are
Killed, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.pressherald.com/2012/12/09/shoot-
across-nation-a-grim-acceptance-when-mentally-ill-shot-down; Brian Hamacher, Man with
Down Syndrome in Clash with Cops, NBC MIAMI (Sept. 17, 2011, 12:06 AM),
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Man-With-Down-Syndrome-in-Clash-With-Cops- 1298
20353.html; Tux Turkel, David Hench & Kelley Bouchard, Deadly Force: Police & the Mentally Ill,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 8-11, 2012), http://www.pressherald.com/interactive/maine
police-deadly force-seriesday_1.
297 See, e.g., Chris McKee, APD: Officer Involved Shooting Was Justified, KRQE NEwS 13 (Oct.
17, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://krqe.com/2014/03/21/apd-officer-involved-shooting-was-justified.
298 See id.
299 See id.
300 Sebastian Murdock, Police Shoot Homeless Man During Camping Arrest, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 25, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/24/james-boyd-killed-
by-cops-n_5021117.html.
301 See id.
302 See Cindy Carcamo, Tensions over Albuquerque Police Shootings Intensify Despite Talks,
L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-albuquerque-police-20140510-
story.html.
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practice of excessive and deadly force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and other laws.303 The police department is currently
working on training reforms.304 In addition, despite the position taken
by the Albuquerque Police Department, two of the officers who shot
Boyd were charged with murder ten months after the incident.305 This
incident underscores the need for police to engage people who have a
mental illness with some patience and consider nonlethal force when
there is no clear and present danger to officers. Given that Boyd was not
a public safety threat out in the foothills-and was charged only with
camping-the response was extreme; had the officers employed a less
aggressive strategy he might still be alive.
Even in mundane encounters like Terry stops,3 06 a confrontation
can escalate quickly. Gilberto Powell was approached by Miami police
because an officer noticed a bulge in his pants.307 When Officer Villa
tried to frisk him, the twenty-two-year-old with Down Syndrome tried
to run back into his home.308 According to his family who stepped
outside during the confrontation, two officers tackled Powell, stripped
him, and punched him in the face.309 Officers said he fell down and hit
his head, but photographs of the man appear to show much more injury
than would be caused by a mere fall.310 The bulge turned out to be
Powell's colostomy bag, which was torn from his body during the
scuffle.311 In response to Powell's mother screaming that her son was
impaired, Officer Villa reportedly told her he could not possibly have
known since he is "not a doctor."312 However, before he ever
303 See Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice & Damon P.
Martinez, Acting U.S. Att'y, Dist. of N.M., to Richard J. Berry, Mayor, City of Albuquerque (Apr.
10, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/apd-findings_4-10-
14.pdf.
304 See K. Annabelle Smith, Albuquerque's Shoot-First Police Finally Begin Facing Questions,
ESQUIRE (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/news/albuquerque-shootings.
305 Mike Gallagher & Ryan Boetel, Officers Charged with Murder, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 12,
2015, 9:46 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/524987/news/da-to-seek-murder-charges-against-
officers-in-james-boyd-shooting.html.
306 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a person may be stopped and frisked on
the street absent probable cause if police have reasonable suspicion that the person has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime).
307 See Hamacher, supra note 296.
308 See Michael E. Miller, Fernando Villa, DUI Cop, Was Involved in Two Fatal Shootings and
Beating a Man with Down Syndrome, MIAMI NEw TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/fernando-villa-dui-cop-was-involved-in-two-fatal-
shootings-and-beating-a-man-with-down-syndrome-6554738.
309 See Family Hires Attorney After Police Scuffle with Special Needs Man, CBS MIAMI (Sept. 14,
2011, 10:48 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/09/14/family-hires-attorney-after-police-
scuffle-with-special-needs-man.
310 See id. (picturing Powell's injuries).
311 See id.
312 See Five Foot Tall Man with Down Syndrome Beaten by Police for ?Bulge in Pants? That
Turns Out to Be on, YouTUBE (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpZsY
OJRKkl; see also Hamacher, supra note 296.
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encountered Powell, Villa had served on the city's SWAT team; he was
on street patrol when the incident transpired because he had been
transferred following a controversial sting operation in which four
people were killed, including the undercover informant who was shot
while trying to surrender as he lay on the ground.313 Incidents like the
one involving Powell are escalating with alarming frequency as a result
of officers trained to react with soldier mentalities to a public that is
usually not aware of being engaged in a war, even if the public is one
that is unencumbered by a mental disability.314
Training for war has sometimes led police to react too quickly-
before properly assessing real potential risks-with disastrous results. In
one such instance, a police officer pulled behind a car in a convenience
store and as the driver got out to enter the store, asked him to produce a
driver's license.315 When the driver turned back toward his car and
reached in for his wallet, the officer almost immediately began firing at
313 See Interoffice Memorandum from Staffing/Review Team, Office of the State Att'y,
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, to Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Att'y (Mar. 13, 2014), available at
https://cbsmiami.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/redlandcloseout.pdf.
314 See, e.g., Travis Gettys, Jury Can't Decide if Cop Who Destroyed Woman's Eyeballs with
Pepper Spray Should Go to Prison, RAW STORY (May 20, 2014, 9:41 AM),
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/05/20/jury-cant-decide-if-cop-who-destroyed-womans-
eyeballs-with-pepper-spray-should-go-to-prison (woman blinded when officer sprayed JPX
pepper gel at 400 miles per hour directly into her face slicing through both eyeballs after she
squirmed while being handcuffed); Jessica Glenza, Cleveland Medical Examiners Rule Death of
Tamir Rice a Homicide, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2014, 1:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/dec/12/death-black-child-ruled-homicide (responding to call of a juvenile with a
possible toy gun, officers are seen on video quickly approaching in their police car, jumping out,
and shooting twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in about two seconds; the officers, however, did not face
charges); Michael Kinney, Case Closed in Rodriguez Death, NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Oct. 13, 2014,
1:19 PM), http://www.normantranscript.com/news/local news/article_7598b88-c853-5eee-
8713-6dlbdcce4f49.html (officers' actions found reasonable in case of man beaten to death
outside movie theater when police respond to fight between man's wife and daughter and believe
him to be threat when he folds arms and attempts to walk around officer after being asked for
identification); Phil Trexler, Deputy Pries Open Woman's Mouth After She Takes Tylenol, AKRON
BEACON J. (May 15, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/deputy-pries-open-
woman-s-mouth-after-she-takes-tylenol-1.488137 (woman in courthouse waiting room took two
Tylenol and sheriffs deputy demanded she spit them out but she had already swallowed, so
deputy threw her to ground and attempted to pry them from her mouth causing bleeding and
pulling out her hair, then charged her with resisting arrest); Justin Warmoth, Dayton Beach Police
Officer Resigns After Body Camera Turned Off During Arrest, CLICK ORLANDO (May 15, 2014,
6:02 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/daytona-beach-police-officer-fired-after-body-
camera-turned-off-during-arrest/25982532 (woman slammed to ground and flashlight jammed
into her mouth when officers thought she swallowed cocaine resulting in several broken teeth);
see also Adam Ferrise, Cleveland Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice Had 'Dismal' Handgun
Performance for Independence Police, PLAIN DEALER (Dec. 4, 2014, 7:28 AM),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/12/cleveland-police officer whos.html (officer
who killed Tamir Rice fired from another department before joining Cleveland Police
Department because he could not follow simple instructions or handle his weapon properly).
315 See Tony Santaella & Steven Dial, Trooper on Shooting: 'He Kept Coming Towards Me,'
WLTX 19 (Sept. 27, 2014, 1:55 AM), http://www.wltx.com/story/news/local/2014/09/26/sean-
groubert-gives-his-account-of-shooting-levar-jones/16295527.
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him, striking him in the hip.316 The officer was fired and faces charges in
the incident, but what is conspicuous about the video recording of the
incident is how clear it appears that the officer was truly terrified.317
Notably, the officer was white and the victim was black, so how and
whether race played a role in the officer's snap decision to begin firing-
without provocation-is more than a little concerning, given the fear-
based training that officers undergo. Similarly, in Beavercreek, Ohio,
John Crawford was killed by police while walking around a Walmart
carrying an air rifle he picked up from a store shelf.318 Video of that
incident shows the officer approached the far end of the aisle where
Crawford was talking on his phone, holding the rifle downward, and
immediately shooting him dead.319 The officer was not indicted despite
the fact that Ohio is an "open carry" state-so had it been a real, loaded
gun, Crawford's actions would have been perfectly legal.320 The white
officer (who shot that black victim) had, some days earlier, attended a
training on active shooter scenarios in which slides of the shooting
aftermath at Sandy Hook Elementary School were shown, with the
caption, "If not you, then who?"321 When police training mirrors
military training, and fear becomes the primary motivator, bad
outcomes are hardly surprising.
3. SWAT and Nonemergency Deployments
One indicator of the culture of police militarization is the
increasing use of SWAT teams for nonemergency purposes.322 Driven
primarily by the "war on drugs," SWAT teams are deployed to serve
warrants more than any other activity.323 However, police deploy them
for other nontraditional activities as well.324 The presence of heavily
316 Clif LeBlanc, Motorist Shot by Trooper Gets Nearly $300,000 Settlement from State
Government, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 7, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
news/local/crime/article9509405.html.
317 See id.
318 See Jon Swaine, Ohio Police Given 'Pep Talk' on Shooting Scenarios Ahead of Walmart
Encounter, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/
25/ohio-walmart-police-slideshow-active-shooter-presentation.
319 See id.
320 See Mikki Kendall, John Crawford: Killed Holding a 'Gun' in an Open Carry State, EBONY
(Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.ebony.com/news-views/john-crawford-killed-405; see also Swaine,
supra note 318.
321 See MIKE DEWINE, OHIO ATT'Y GEN., SINGLE OFFICER RESPONSE TO ACTIVE THREATS:
WHAT TO Do WHEN YOU ARE THE FIRST ON THE SCENE (July 23-24, 2014), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/241009406/Beavercreek-police-training-presentation; Swaine, supra
note 318.
322 See BALKO, supra note 7, at 191-92.
323 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 3.
324 See Natasha Lennard, Arkansas Town's Martial Law Plan, SALON (Jan. 29, 2013, 5:08 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/01/29/arkansas townenactsmartiallaw. In 2013, the police chief
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armed police using military weapons and armor to carry out
nonemergency tasks contributes to the sense that the line between the
police and the military is becoming very thin.
Using SWAT teams to handle nonviolent situations in which there
is no evidence or information that officers might be in danger is a
misuse of paramilitary tactics that threatens civilians and requires
reform. Radley Balko, an expert on police militarization, has collected a
number of stories of SWAT teams operating in nonemergency
scenarios.325 One case involved Sal Culosi, who was killed by a SWAT
team when an officer accidentally discharged his weapon.326 The SWAT
team was initially deployed to arrest him for illegal gambling.327 CUlOSi
had befriended a detective with whom he made small bets on sports
games, and over the course of a year he began to make bets high enough
to qualify for felony charges.328 A SWAT presence was entirely
unwarranted and caused his death. Similarly, SWAT raids have been
deployed for numerous poker games, including a Veterans of Foreign
Wars charity tournament.329
In some cases, regulatory agencies are sending SWAT teams to
perform administrative investigations. In Alaska, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) carried out a fully armed raid on the tiny
mining village of Chicken-with seventeen full-time residents-looking
for violations of the Clean Water Act.330 The miners wondered why they
did not simply come and ask to check the water. Instead, in full battle
gear, eight armed EPA officers swept into the village.331 Over the course
of several months in 2010, SWAT teams were sent to black and
Hispanic-owned stores to enforce administrative laws.332 They charged
thirty-four people with barbering without a license.333 The fact that such
administrative searches are not, on their face, intended to search for
illegal drugs, allows SWAT teams to conduct them without warrants if a
member of the regulatory agency comes with them.334 However, this use
of SWAT teams is wholly unnecessary and serves no purpose other than
in Paragould, Arkansas, informed the public that his SWAT team would be conducting routine
patrols armed with AR-15 assault rifles and stopping every person they saw, demanding
identification, and inquiring about where they were going and why. See id. The plan was scrapped
after public outcry. See id.
325 See BALKO, supra note 7.
326 See id. at 280-81.
327 See id.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 283.
330 See Sean Doogan, Gold Miners Near Chicken Cry Foul over 'Heavy-Handed' EPA Raids,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEwS, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.adn.com/article/20130903/gold-miners-near-
chicken-cry-foul-over-heavy-handed-epa-raids.
331 See id.
332 See BALKO, supra note 7, 283-84.
333 Id. at 284.
334 Id.
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to utilize the military gear police departments have acquired and to
foment fear.
B. Efforts to Curb the Escalating Militarization of Police
As laid out in Part II, courts have been slow to respond to the
harmful effects of police militarization. Given the current state of
jurisprudence, relief is unlikely to be found in the Supreme Court.335
Since the Court is more focused on violations involving the scope of
searches rather than the manner in which they are executed, SWAT
transgressions are difficult to regulate in the judicial arena. However, as
the landscape shifts and citizens begin to demand redress, the Court
may find itself forced into action in the near future, not to change its
recent precedents, but to recognize that a gap exists that must be filled
by more than legislation. The Court may come to recognize that there
are constitutional implications to manner violations that have not found
a forum to accommodate them as cases proliferate and public outcry
amplifies the extent of the problem. Meanwhile, policymakers in other
arenas have made efforts to slow-and even end-the practice of arming
and training domestic police with military equipment and tactics. Part
JJJ.B analyzes these efforts and offers some possible remedies to slow or
even stop the precipitous transformation of police, from peace officers
to soldiers.
Federal legislation is one avenue by which militarization can be
regulated and possibly reversed. While Congressman Alan Grayson's
bill336-attempting to limit certain weapons and armaments transferred
through the 1033 Program-was defeated in 2013, Congressman Hank
Johnson sponsored a bill in 2014 called the "Stop Militarizing Law
Enforcement Act."337 The timing of the bill coincides with a surge in
public awareness and anger about police militarization-culminating in
prolonged nationwide protests338-that began when police responded to
demonstrations over the police shooting of an unarmed teenager named
335 See supra Part II.A.
336 See H. Amdt. 918 to H.R. 4870, 113th Cong. (2014) (introduced by Representative Alan
Grayson on June 19, 2014).
337 See H.R. 5478, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-bill/5478/all-actions (currently in committee and cosponsored by forty-nine
House members); see also Anna Palmer & Jake Sherman, Dem Pushes Ferguson Machine Gun Bill,
POLITICO (Aug. 15, 2014, 6:29 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/dem-pushes-
feguson-machine-gun-bill-1 001 1.html.





Michael Brown in August 2014.339 Nightly protests in Ferguson,
Missouri, a town with a majority black population and majority white
police force,340 raised questions among the public about the need for
BearCats, snipers, wooden bullets, and tear gas to respond to
predominately peaceful demonstrations.341 Johnson spoke out about
militarization before events in Ferguson unfolded, and explained his
intention to craft such a bill in response to the federal grant programs
fueling militarized policing.342 However, events in Ferguson-and other
protests across the United States related to a string of violent police-
involved deaths of unarmed black victims343-prompted him and other
lawmakers, including Senator Rand Paul, to ramp up their efforts to
address the issue.344 In December 2014, as protests spread and the issue
of police accountability continued to dominate the news, Congress
passed a measure requiring states to report the number of people killed
in police custody or incident to arrest.3 4 5 Such requirements have not
been in effect since the same law lapsed in 2006-despite four attempts
to reauthorize it-until now.346 As lawmakers from both the Republican
and the Democratic parties begin raising a call to action, it is possible
that Congress could pass legislation that might begin to curb federal
programs that give both the funding and the military equipment to
339 See Julie Bosman & Timothy Williams, Missouri Police Cite Threats in Deciding Not to
Name Officer Who Shot Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/
13/us/ferguson-police-cite-safety-risk-in-decision-not-to-name-officer-in-shooting.html.
340 See id.
341 See Elizabeth R. Beavers & Michael Shank, Op-Ed., Get the Military Off of Main Street:
Ferguson Shows the Risk of Police Militarization, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/opinion/ferguson-shows-the-risks-of-militarized-
policing.html.
342 See Hank Johnson & Michael Shank, Small Town America Shouldn't Resemble a War Zone,
USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/03/10/america-police-
military-weapons-column/5789445.
343 Responding to the failure of a grand jury to indict officers charged with choking Eric
Garner to death during an incident captured entirely on video, for selling loose cigarettes,
protesters in New York held numerous demonstrations and marches. See Protests Continue Over
Eric Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2014/12/14/ny
region/20141214NYPROTESTss.html; see also 'Black Lives Matter' Protests, CNN (Feb. 4, 2015,
4:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/13/us/gallery/black-lives-matter-protests ( lideshow
depicting protests from New York, Seattle, Chicago, Oakland, and Washington, D.C. under the
hashtag "#blacklivesmatter," in response to the police killings of Michael Brown, John Crawford,
Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old shot in Cleveland while he was playing with a toy
gun).
344 See Rand Paul, We Must Demilitarize the Police, TIME, Aug. 14, 2014, http://time.com/
3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police.
345 See Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, H.R. 1447, 113th Cong. (2014), available at
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/12/10/senate-section/article/S6579-3.
346 See Hunter Schwarz, Congress Decides to Get Serious About Tracking Police Shootings,
WASH. POST POL. BLOG (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/
2014/12/11/congress-decides-to-get-serious-about-tracking-police-shootings ( oting legislation
reauthorizing same bill that was in effect from 2000-2006).
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police departments that encourage the kind of aggressive policing
national protests have sought to address.
Only a handful of state legislatures have addressed militarized
policing policies so far. In 2010, Maryland passed legislation requiring
police to track and record all SWAT team raids.347 That law expired in
2014, although lawmakers intend to reintroduce it in 2015.348 The law
required police to generate a report every six months that included
information about each deployment, including the purpose, the type of
warrant used, the arrests made, and the property seized.349 The results of
that transparency were striking, since such data is usually not made
public, if it is tracked at all. The Maryland data covering 2012 showed
that SWAT teams were used 4.5 times each day, with one county
responsible for over 500 deployments.350 About two-thirds of SWAT
raids used dynamic entries and almost 90% were to execute search
warrants, half of those for drugs.351 In a third of the raids, no arrests
were made, and in 15% of them, no contraband was seized.352 The
results from 2014 showed a 2.4% increase in SWAT deployments, with
93% for the purpose of carrying out search warrants.353 The other
statistics remained relatively unchanged.354 Utah passed a similar bill in
2014 requiring police to track information and report annually on all
tactical deployments.355 It includes requiring information on all injuries,
including those to pets.356 Utah is also considering one of the boldest
initiatives in the country to address state law governing any forcible
entry.357 The bill would ban "no-knock" raids for the preservation of
evidence and require the suppression of evidence obtained in violation
of the "knock-and-announce" requirement.358 The Utah law would
347 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-507 (2010) (abrogated July 1, 2014); MD.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIFTH
REPORT TO THE STATE OF MARYLAND UNDER PUBLIC SAFETY ARTICLE § 3-507: FISCAL YEAR 2014
SWAT TEAM DEPLOYMENT DATA ANALYSIS (2014), available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/
msac/documents/SWATReportFY2014.pdf.
348 See Justin George, Police Agencies No Longer Need to Report Race, SWAT Deployments,
BALT. SUN, July 5, 2014, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-07-05/news/bs-md-sun-
investigates-race-law-20140705_1_law-enforcement-agencies-deborah-jeon.
349 Id.





353 See MD. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 347, at 3, 6.
354 See id.
355 See S.B. 185, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014), available at http://le.utah.gov/-2014/bills/
static/sb0185.html (Law Enforcement Transparency).
356 Id.
357 S.B. 82, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015), available at http://le.utah.gov/-2015/bills/static/




effectively override the Supreme Court's holding in Hudson v.
Michigan.359 As the first state to include police officers in its self-defense
law, Indiana approved a law in 2012 that permits a homeowner to use
deadly force against police officers who enter a home unlawfully. 360 The
state legislature passed the law after a 2011 Indiana Supreme Court case
held that "there is no right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police
officers."361 Other states should look to Maryland, Utah, and Indiana for
guidance in analyzing the ways in which SWAT teams are utilized so
that they can make any necessary policy changes or amendments to
existing laws.
The Supreme Court should consider revisiting caselaw addressing
Fourth Amendment violations and qualified immunity in order to
permit the establishment of precedents that will define the laws
governing excessive force for future constitutional tort claims. As
discussed in Part II, the Court overturned the rule in Saucier that
required courts to address constitutional violations before turning to the
issue of qualified immunity,362 leaving it to the discretion of the courts
to determine whether to follow that two-step analysis.363 Yet the Court
itself has followed the two-step analysis in analyzing such claims,364 thus
it certainly recognizes the efficacy of doing so, and should require all
courts to follow suit. Therefore, the Court should reinstate the Saucier
analysis for lower courts to follow so that clearly established laws can be
created more readily. The Court should also revisit its decision to make
constitutional tort claims the only remedy for excessive force violations
and should apply the exclusionary rule in criminal cases where excessive
force has occurred.365 This course is unlikely given its prevailing
assumption that exclusion is unnecessary because police are better
trained than they were when Mapp v. Ohio was decided.366 However, it
behooves the Court to at least consider whether this belief is actually
accurate. Given the number of violent encounters, and the militaristic
training police officers undergo, the Court should reconsider such
assumptions about the current state of police training.
359 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
360 IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2012) (as amended by Self-Defense-Reasonable Force-Duty to
Retreat, 2006 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 189-2006 (West)).
361 Barnes v. Indiana, 946 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. 2011).
362 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
363 See supra Part II; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
364 See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (finding that numerous shots fired at
fleeing vehicle was not violation of Fourth Amendment although qualified immunity would have
foreclosed § 1983 suit because no clearly established law existed at time of incident regarding
whether such force was reasonable).
365 See supra Part II.B for discussion of dissents in Ankeny and Hudson calling for exclusionary
rule application to excessive force claims.
366 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Citizens have come together to slow the militarization trends in
their own cities and towns with limited success.3 6 7 In Keene, New
Hampshire, where there is an active libertarian population, the public
outcry over the city council's proposal to take possession of a free
BearCat from the 1033 Program stopped the acquisition for a time.368
Lenco's sales manager predicted that Keene would eventually get one,
saying: "We have Bearcats in 90 percent of the 100 or so largest cities in
America.... This is going to happen. It has already happened. To resist
now would be like saying police officers should scrap the Glock and go
back to the revolver. It's a fantasy."369 He was right: Keene now has
one.3 7 0 The citizens of Concord, New Hampshire, also fought against
getting a BearCat and lost.371 The city's application actually named the
libertarians as a reason for needing one.3 7 2 While these attempts
ultimately failed, they did raise awareness about the federal programs
providing them and prompted dialogue about militarization.
Additionally, the images broadcast from the Ferguson protests-
showing tanks and snipers trained against civilians there-prompted
citizens in two California towns to insist that their police departments
return the MRAPs they received from the federal government.37 3 Such
efforts should continue as more information becomes available about
the ways in which police departments use such equipment.
There are worthwhile movements afoot to address the growing
militarization of American police departments-from legislation to
citizen resistance-but more must be done to effectively curb the
growing trend. The "war on drugs" has incentivized the escalation of
militarization and aggressive policing, and should be curtailed. Sixty-
seven percent of Americans believe treatment should be the focus,
rather than prosecution and incarceration.374 State and federal
lawmakers have begun limited reforms in the area of drug crime
367 See Radley Balko, Police 'Tank' Purchase Riles New Hampshire Town, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 17, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/police-tank-purchase-
new-hampshire n 1279983.html.
368 See id.
369 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
370 See Cantu, supra note 11.
371 See Ryan Lessard, Concord City Council Votes in Favor of BearCat, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Sept.
10, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://nhpr.org/post/concord-city-council-votes-favor-bearcat.
372 N.H. DEP'T OF SAFETY, GRANTS MANAGEMENT UNIT GRANT APPLICATION CFDA #97.067
(2012), available at http://freestateproject.org/sites/default/files/content type-files/blogs/
concordbearcatifull.pdf. The application names a group called Free Staters, which is a
libertarian group that opposed the acquisition of the BearCat, calling it a domestic threat. See id.
The application also refers to Occupy New Hampshire as a domestic threat. See id.
373 See Alex Dobuzinskis, Two California Cities to Give Up Military Vehicles, amid Local
Unease, REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/30/us-usa-
police-vehicles-idUSKBNOGU01720140830.
374 See ACLU Report, supra note 22, at 2.
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enforcement and mandatory minimum sentences for drug felonies;375
efforts that should be expanded. Maryland and Utah are using
transparency as a method to at least track SWAT raids, and it may prove
effective; certainly, other states should follow suit. On the federal level,
Hank Johnson's bill may finally succeed376 given the anger and
awareness brought about by events in Ferguson, Missouri.377 However,
while Johnson seeks only to limit the weapons provided by the 1033
Program, this Article makes the case that the 1033 Program is wholly
unnecessary and primarily serves only to fuel militarization. DHS grants
are similarly problematic and should be curtailed or ended. Moreover,
those federal grants that tie funding to arrest statistics, like Byrne JAG
grants, are unethical and dangerous and should also be ended. However,
one of the most obstinate problems facing those who wish to
demilitarize police is the corporate money flowing into Congress, as
discussed in Part I.A. There are few regulations limiting campaign
contributions because of recent Supreme Court decisions378 which
leaves citizens vulnerable to the defense industry that can spend lavishly
on contributions and lobbyists to ensure military gear keeps flowing to
police departments through federal grants.379
CONCLUSION
The 1033 Program should be terminated. The DHS grant program
should be regulated and oversight implemented to prevent militarizing
police departments. Weapons like assault rifles, grenade launchers, and
APCs that were designed and manufactured for use in war zones should
not be used against American citizens. Federal grants to police
departments should not be tied to arrest statistics, but should be
375 Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Selects Policy
Priorities for 2014-2015 Guidelines Amendment Cycle (Aug. 14, 2014), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-
releases/20140814 Press Release-Revised.pdf ("The Commission once again set as its top priority
continuing to work with Congress to implement the recommendations in its 2011 report on
federal mandatory minimum penalties, which included recommendations that Congress reduce
the severity and scope of some mandatory minimum penalties and consider expanding the 'safety
valve' statute which exempts certain low-level non-violent offenders from mandatory minimum
penalties."); Drug Law Changes, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, http://dcjs.ny.gov/drug-
law-reform/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
376 See Palmer & Sherman, supra note 337.
377 See Bosman & Williams, supra note 1.
378 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking two-year aggregate limits but
upholding base limits); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that Congress may
not limit independent spending by corporations or unions on "electioneering communications,"
gutting McCain-Feingold).
379 See Karena Rahall, The Siren Is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends Toward
Privatization of Public Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633 (2014) (discussing campaign finance
and police privatization efforts).
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regulated through policies governing the appropriate use of the funds.
Finally, courts should be required to analyze whether the police actions
in excessive force claims violate the Fourth Amendment before
determining whether qualified immunity is applicable.
The police chief of the small town of Neenah, Wisconsin
responded to citizen concerns about the town acquiring an MRAP by
declaring: "We're not going to go out there as Officer Friendly with no
body armor and just a handgun and say 'Good enough."'380 The
question is: why not?
380 Matt Apuzzo, War Gear Flows to Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/us/war-gear-flows-to-police-departments.html.
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